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Contemporary British politics seems to be rife with confusion, conflict, and complexities. All 
of which is creating a feeling of political apathy. The very way we interact with one another 
in the sphere of politics is becoming more and more challenged. With the right approach we 
can begin to understand not only our engagement within politics but also our relationships 
with others within this complex domain. Despite the many, and varied, approaches to 
politics, I find there to be something missing. A new perspective is needed, one that can 
enable us to get to the heart of the problem. This fresh approach will be phenomenological 
in nature, and will adhere to Heidegger’s phenomenology as portrayed in Being and Time. In 
spite of the concern surrounding Heidegger’s own participation in politics, I believe that 
Being and Time still contains much that can be employed in this project. By framing 
intersubjective relationships in terms of authenticity it will become clear just how damaging 
our interactions with others have become, including within the realm of British politics. I 
intend to explore Heidegger’s concept of Mitsein and then supplement it with an 
amalgamation of: Lawrence Vogel’s and Werner Marx’s reconstructions of Mitsein; and 
Lauren Freeman’s account of Heideggerian recognition. All of which will help me establish a 
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In today’s climate, often just the mere mention of politics can create a sluggish 
response, a feeling of apathy, and even confusion. In part these negative reactions emerge 
from a domain that can, at times, become shrouded in a fog of negative connotations. 
However, fogs do clear eventually given the right atmosphere. Our negative reactions to 
politics may dissipate, if we are able to approach this field in the right mind-set. My aim 
then in this project is to do just that.  
I will be drawing on contemporary British politics, in order to present some of the 
issues that I believe are rife within the realm of politics; and also to suggest ways of viewing 
these issues in order to arrive at solutions. I will provide a different way of framing politics 
which will be phenomenological in nature. Specifically, it will be Heideggerian; and will 
primarily draw on Heidegger’s philosophy in Being and Time.1 Heidegger offers a unique 
way of delving into Being, he aims to understand our capacity to make sense of things, 
people, and the world within which we live. This exploration into Being will be useful when 
trying to lay the groundwork for an approach to politics. With the help of Werner Marx and 
Lawrence Vogel a form of authentic Mitsein will be reconstructed from Heidegger’s BT. An 
examination of Lauren Freeman’s paper will provide us with an accessible Heideggerian 
account of recognition.2 All of which will enable us to construct a kind of Heideggerian 
ethics that has authentic Mitsein at its heart. With that we will be able to demonstrate that 
Being and Time does have the framework to support positive interactions with other 
people, and therefore can provide the foundations for the way we view people, and also the 
way we ought to be viewing them. My conclusion will be that we are able to gain a useful, 
and interesting perspective, when we approach politics in a phenomenological way.  
A Phenomenological Approach 
 
 
1 Hereby will be referred to as BT  
2 Lauren Freeman, “Recognition Reconsidered: A re-reading of Heidegger’s Being and Time S. 26” in Philosophy 




I will present an analytical approach to politics, in order to compare with the 
phenomenological approach that I will be taking.  An analytical approach to politics might be 
to tease and draw out words and concepts from the overarching concept of ‘Politics’ such 
as: representation, power, justice, laws, democracy, parliament. Then, we might try to 
define what those words mean, analyse the different concepts involved, argue whether or 
not those words do, or should belong to politics. By doing this we can create a general idea 
of what politics is: a working definition. This working definition can help us to suggest ways 
of improving upon politics, for example: good representation seems to be a concept that is 
lacking within contemporary British politics, the next step would (hopefully) be how can we 
change that, how can we incorporate good representation into our working definition of 
politics? In this way, an analytical approach to politics can be useful- it helps us update the 
working definition. It is after all a working definition, it should be altering all the time, 
changing with the current climate and expectations.  
 
An analytical approach tends to emphasise conceptual analysis, such as the kind that 
has been described above. Writers such as John Rawls, Isaiah Berlin and G.A. Cohen spring 
to mind when exploring the realm of analytical political philosophy. It could be argued that 
they all use analytical techniques in their work, techniques which are often characterized by 
a thoroughness and meticulousness about a specific topic, teamed with a resistance to 
inexact or haphazard discussion, in order to create a logical argument in favour of their 
position.3 It is a method that can provide us with many interesting results, however it isn’t 
an approach I will be utilising.  
In order to demonstrate how the methodology I will be using differs to that of the 
analytical political approach it might be useful to frame it in comparison with another 
approach. For the purpose of this comparative analysis I’ve chosen Rawls and his theory of 
justice, specifically his veil of ignorance.   
 
3 Aaron Preston, Analytic Philosophy (https://www.iep.utm.edu/analytic/) [accessed 10.12.18] (para. 2 of 104) 
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Rawls develops a conception of justice that could be described as very Kantian in 
nature.4 In this theory, justice is depicted as fairness, which in turn is a universal moral ideal. 
Rawls attempts to uncover the fundamental moral principles that ought to standardise 
judgements and reasoning about justice.5  He makes use of a hypothetical social agreement 
to argue for certain principles of justice. He suggests three principles: the principle of equal 
basic liberties, the principle of equal opportunities, and the difference principle.6 Equal basic 
liberties is essentially an egalitarian stance: each person has an equal right to liberties, with 
similar liberties for all.7 The difference principle states that economic and social inequalities 
should be organised so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged 
amongst us, and attached to positions and offices which are open to all, thus everyone has 
an equal opportunity to them.8 The veil of ignorance means that the people involved are 
deprived of all knowledge about their gender or wealth, as well as any other information 
that might advantage or disadvantage them in their discussion.9 The group of peoples are 
essentially alone behind a veil of ignorance, in the original position. The idea is that there 
wouldn’t need to be a discussion as all behind the veil would come to the same decision, 
individually.10 The decision about the principles of justice is ahistorical, and will therefore be 
impartial with respect to peoples’ natural characteristics and skills, social status and their 
own concept of the ‘good’. In this sense, the veil of ignorance is a ‘thick’ veil, as peoples’ 
prior knowledge is very limited.  
The original position does quite a good job of mirroring the abstract individuality and 
the instrumental rationality that seems to be characteristic of modern public existence.11 
Rawls is trying to arrive at a concept of justice by means of the contemplation of individuals 
considered in abstraction from their relationship with each other; a first person – singular 
 
4 Samuel Freeman, “Introduction John Rawls – An Overview” in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2003) p.1.  
5 S. Freeman, p.2. 
6 Poole, p.74-75 
7 Poole, p.75.  
8 S. Freeman, p.4.  
9 S. Freeman, p.11.  
10 Poole, p.76 
11 Poole, p.78.  
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account.12 It thus simulates a kind of isolation as a pre-condition, and also the effect of the 
institution of public life.13  
I wish to align myself with Poole by suggesting that although Rawls would like to 
state that he is dealing with the first person, he is actually dealing with the third person.14 
This is because the individuals are deprived from so much knowledge that they almost 
become a third person looking in on the situation. The decision that they reach is thus 
obtained from a third person perspective.  
Either way you look at it: whether it is first person – singular or third person, the 
account is missing something: other people’s perspective, or a first-person perspective.  
This type of individualisation and isolation involved in Rawls’ methodology is 
something I wish to steer clear of. It has its part to play in his theory, however 
intersubjectivity as a positive is something I’m wanting to draw out in my project. The 
individual has an important part to play in a political theory, and the individual within the 
project of politics is going to be an essential focus for me. However, this focus will rely on 
the individual being able to recognise that she is situated in a world that is a certain way, 
and that this world has within it other people, who might have different thoughts, plans, 
goals to her, as an individual. In this way I’m interested in a first person plural perspective. 
This perspective is going to be crucial for me, therefore an ahistorical methodology could be 
detrimental.  
 
At a foundational level the ontological assumptions are at odds with the ones I will 
be drawing on. Thus, the approach, and the methodology that I think will be beneficial to 
my project will not be Rawlsian in nature. My suggestion is a phenomenological approach. 
Such an approach can be defined as one that concentrates on phenomena experienced 
from a first person point of view. A phenomenological approach to contemporary politics, 
would be one that focusses on how we personally experience politics, how we approach 
politics.  It would truly put the people back into the political equation. Instead of trying to 
view politics from a third person, bird’s eye, perhaps even a hypothetical point of view that 
 
12 Poole, p.78. 
13 Poole, p.78.  
13 Poole, p.78. 
14 Poole, p.78. 
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is purely concentrating on the conceptual or analytical, we will be viewing it from a first 
person perspective. Given that the current political climate, everywhere, is (to put it lightly) 
tense, it is worth approaching the issue from every way possible- after all, it can’t hurt!  
There are aspects of intersubjectivity that are breaking down within the sphere of 
politics. Whatever the reason, and I will go into more detail later, something has to give. 
This is part of the reason I feel that a phenomenological approach could be insightful. If 
intersubjectivity is breaking down, is it not beneficial to utilise an approach that dives in 
directly through first person experience? This way, we can tackle the issue head on, from a 
different, first-person perspective. Given that part of the issue is a disconnectedness within 
the system, for example, people becoming less engaged in politics; a general feeling of 
despondence with the way politics is ‘playing out’, perhaps it is with a phenomenological 
approach that people will become re-engaged. A phenomenological method can be quite 
motivating. This is partly because its project is so first-person centred, it almost demands a 
reaction from the reader, one which primarily involves a questioning of the self, for 
example: am I authentic, do I act in this or that way? The approach seems to, almost 
intrinsically, elicit a response. It was in fact Merleau-Ponty who suggested that we can only 
really understand phenomenology by doing it.15 This is ideal for my project, as a response, a 
reaction, a deep engagement with politics is what is wanting. So, by analysing contemporary 
British politics in a phenomenological way I hope to present an alternative approach, one 
that can help re-frame politics in a more favourable light.  
 
A phenomenological method can also help strip our experiences down to the bare 
bones. It can help us to break down our day-to-day experiences and make us question them 
or see them in a new light. Phenomenology can help us to reduce intersubjectivity to its 
foundations, by questioning it: for example, what is it really to interact with someone, what 
is it to be in a world with others. This method will expose us to these foundations in order to 
recognise what intersubjectivity is. Phenomenology can assist us in regaining sight of 
foundational aspects of our everyday living: a valuable perspective when analysing what is 
breaking down in politics, and how we can alter that. A phenomenological approach to 
 
15David E. Cooper, Existentialism, second edition (Blackwell Publishing, 1999) p.2 
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politics can help us to become more thoughtful about politics, perhaps even more informed, 
in order for us to act responsibly when engaged in politics.  
The phenomenological approach I will be taking will be Heideggerian. The 
Heideggerian concepts I will be drawing upon have primarily taken shape in BT. 16 The focus 
will therefore be on his earlier writings, as opposed to his later writings; those prior to ‘the 
turn’ of the 1930s. I have chosen this because there were certain concepts contained within 
BT that I found would be useful when applied to politics. These are concepts such as: 
authenticity, Mitsein, and das Man. I will start my project by exploring Heidegger’s BT.  
I will be using a Heideggerian framework in order to show some of the more 
fundamental issues we are facing within contemporary politics. My method will be both 
descriptive and evaluative. I will describe the issues in Heideggerian terms, then I will 
present ‘solutions’ again in Heideggerian terms in the hope that this method sheds a new 
light on contemporary politics, one which will not only be quite unique but also refreshing 
and beneficial. I will begin by going into a little bit of detail about Heidegger’s involvement 
in politics. 
 
Heidegger’s Involvement in the Nazi Party 
 
Heidegger joined the Nazi Party in 1933.17 Although he was not a prominent member 
of the party he imagined and expected to play a major part. Moreover, he never officially 
apologised for the role he played. The most he has said is that his participation was the 
biggest stupidity of his life. Which begs the question, what for Heidegger made it the 
‘biggest stupidity’? We hope that it is an obvious answer, but sadly there are details which 
make people doubt Heidegger’s potentially apologetic reasoning.   
There are many papers, books, articles on Heidegger’s involvement with the Nazi 
Party; you can rarely put Heidegger and politics in the same sentence without Nazi Party 
coming up – and rightly so. The concern that arises from his involvement is whether or not 
his philosophy is connected to his politics, and whether, because of this, his philosophy is 
contaminated. I wish to align with people such as Peter Trawny who believe that instead of 
 
16 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, Trans. By John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 1962). 
17 Note that this was six years after he wrote BT  
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condemning his philosophy, we should be condemning the man, Martin Heidegger.18 Just as 
you wouldn’t suggest that because a person has a skin disease, that they should be cast to 
the wayside, so we shouldn’t disregard Heidegger’s philosophy as being contaminated 
because of his involvement in the Nazi party.  
Since the publication of the Black Notebooks, and his correspondence with his 
brother Fritz, there can be no doubt of Heidegger’s views on the National Socialist Party, 
and also the degree of his anti-Semitism. As someone who has been reading and re-reading 
BT for the last couple of years, his views on these topics are very disconcerting. Not only did 
he write anti-Semitically, but he tried to justify his views by giving them a philosophical 
grounding: “Jews are uprooted from Being-in-the World”—that is, incapable of authentically 
caring and understanding.19 The publications would suggest that he was passionate about 
the National Socialist Party, partly because he felt that finally his ideas and his philosophies 
could come to fruition, via the party. Primarily, this is the concern: that his alignment with 
the National Socialist Party actually makes sense, given his philosophy as described in BT.  
Although you can draw a politics from BT there actually isn’t an explicit politics. Any 
work below to create an ethics from BT, can at best be called a Heideggerian reconstruction. 
This sort of reconstruction is possible simply because he didn’t spell out a politics, or indeed 
an ethics. Perhaps all we can say about the political element of BT is that it is wanting. 
Therefore a politics, whether it is a negative one that could help justify a political party such 
as the Nazi Party, or a positive one which promotes freedom, are both possible. Perhaps 
then, the most damning aspect of BT is that it can permit Nazi tendencies; that it doesn’t 
directly fight against such a movement.  
It could be argued that by presenting an alternative approach to politics than 
Heidegger’s own nationalistic political agenda, that nonetheless is still based on his 
philosophies in BT, I can help reinforce the idea that it is not a contaminated philosophy.  
Heidegger’s involvement in the National Socialist Party is a deeply debated topic. 
Unfortunately, to get truly caught up in such a debate is outside the scope of my project. I 
think it sufficient to recognise that Heidegger’s Nazism is indeed troubling, and the fact that 
 
18 Joshua Rothman, “Is Heidegger Contaminated by Nazism”, in The New Yorker, April 2014 
(https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/is-heidegger-contaminated-by-nazism) [accessed 10.01.19] 
(para. 14 of 15).  
19 Rothman, (https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/is-heidegger-contaminated-by-nazism) 
[accessed 10.01.19] (para. 5 of 15). 
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I’m trying to suggest that Heideggerian concepts could be useful when approaching 
contemporary British politics, could be problematic given his involvement. However, if you 
take the line that his philosophy in BT isn’t dirtied by such an involvement in Nazism, then 
what I’m suggesting might be reasonable.  
 
Heidegger’s Being and Time 
 
 One of the themes running throughout Heidegger’s BT is authenticity; what it means 
to be authentic, and inauthentic. The central idea surrounding authenticity is a well-
rounded understanding of our own Being; inauthenticity is the inverse – a sort of confusion 
with regards to our own Being. I wish to draw on Heidegger’s concept of authenticity in 
order to demonstrate that it could be a useful term when viewing the ins and outs of 
contemporary British politics. To take a subject such as politics, a subject that is discussed at 
length, is rife with opinions, can be very complex, and then to establish a phenomenological 
way of approaching it, would be invaluable. This is what I hope to achieve, with the jumping 
off point being the Heideggerian sense of authenticity. But first, in order to understand 




In BT, Heidegger suggests that the question of the meaning of Being has thus far been 
misinterpreted, and is by no means obvious.20 He suggests that we need to “raise anew the 
question of the meaning of Being.”21. Fundamentally, this is his aim in BT, to scale down the 
question of the meaning of Being to something that can become known, at an ontological 
and phenomenological level.  
Heidegger proposes that to grasp being we must tackle it via a particular kind of entity: 
Dasein.22 Dasein is a way of approaching the question of Being because, according to 
Heidegger, it is the entity that understands Being: “Understanding of Being is itself a definite 
characteristic of Dasein’s Being.”23.  However, this ‘understanding’ isn’t perfect, it isn’t (at 
 
20 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.1 sz.1 
21 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.1 sz.1  
22 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.68 sz.42. 
23 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.32 sz.12.  
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least at this primary stage) a full-bodied understanding of Being. Dasein, in its typical 
interactions with other entities functions with a pre-ontological understanding of Being. It is 
as if she has a concealed view of the a priori conditions that make certain modes of Being 
possible.24 Strangely enough, it is in this way that we are ontically closest, yet ontologically 
furthest away from Dasein.25 Heidegger thinks it is imperative that we approach the 
question of Being this way because it is important for him that we do not proceed from a 
view from nowhere. We must begin from our own human vantage point. Heidegger 
suggests that the existential analytic of Dasein will be the first port of call when delving into 
the concealed, and shared, underlying meaning of Dasein. 
So then, what exactly is Dasein? Dasein literally translates as Da ‘there’ and Sein ‘being’, 
thus ‘there-being’; it is a way of stating that we are Beings practically engaged in the world. 
We are always situated within the world; we are active participants in reality; we are able to 
lead our lives. It is crucial not to think of Dasein in thing-like terms, it should be understood 
as being very distinct from other entities, such as a desk. Although a desk could be argued to 
reflect some sense of there-being within the world, it reflects this in a radically different way 
to Dasein. One of the fundamental differences between Dasein and a thing – say a desk- is 
that Dasein can take a questioning relation to one’s own being, whereas the desk cannot.  
To take a questioning stance to one’s own Being means to be aware of one’s ability and 
responsibility to make choices, this is founded in Heidegger’s statement that every Dasein 
has an a priori sense of “mineness” or being oneself, this is referred to as Jemeinigkeit.26 
Every Dasein faces various ways of existing within the world, there are many possible 
futures a Dasein could have. To exist is to realize and actualize one of the possible futures 
relevant to you. To live one’s life is to be faced repeatedly with the question of how to be.27 
Compare Dasein (with its being to be) with a cat (a non-human animal). The kind of creature 
it is determines the kinds of things it does, for example, a cat can meow, purr, scratch, jump, 
allegedly has nine lives etc., in this case essence determines existence. On the other hand, 
for Dasein, existence determines essence.28 This is a claim which shifts the long-established 
 
24 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.78 sz.53. 
25 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.37 sz.16. 
26 Heidegger states: “…because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very being, 
‘choose’ itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself, or only ‘seem’ to do so.”  Heidegger, 
Being and Time, p.68 sz.42. 
27 As Heidegger declares, “[Dasein] has its Being to be” Heidegger, Being and Time, p.33 sz.12. 
28 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.67 sz.42. 
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philosophical view that the nature of a thing is a more elemental than the mere fact of its 
being. As Heidegger puts it, “Dasein accordingly takes priority over all other entities in 
several ways. The first priority is an ontical one: Dasein is an entity whose Being has the 
determinate character of existence. The second priority is an ontological one: Dasein is in 
itself ‘ontological’ because existence is thus determinative for it.”29  
Heidegger is aware that to obtain knowledge of Being, through Dasein, could potentially 
be problematic. Dasein is chosen in order to understand Being from an involved perspective 
in order to distance ourselves from a God’s eye view, however at first glance, it seems like 
we’ve arrived at a vantage point that is too involved with Being, and thus is tainted with 
prejudices. In order to grapple with Being then, we need Dasein to have some form of 
constancy, we must try to analyse Dasein from a vantage point that is least likely to be 
prejudiced. Since Dasein can be understood only in relation to the world of which it is a part, 
it isn’t possible to clarify Dasein in abstraction from the world, after all, its being is Being-in-
the-world. Heidegger states, “We must rather choose such a way of access and such a kind 
of interpretation that this entity can show itself in itself and from itself.”30 Heidegger claims 
that this access point is average everydayness; “In this everydayness there are certain 
structures which we shall exhibit – not just any accidental structures, but essential ones 
which, in every kind of Being that factical Dasein may possess, persist as determinative for 
the character of its Being.”31 Therefore, through an exploration of Dasein’s average 
everydayness we can come to learn and understand the general structure of Dasein’s being, 
and thus the general structure of being.  
 
Dasein’s average everydayness can be defined as “Being-in-the-world which is falling 
and disclosed, thrown and projecting, and for which its ownmost potentiality-for-Being is an 
issue, both in its Being alongside the ‘world’ and in its Being-with-Others”.”32 Heidegger’s 
account of average everydayness can thus be taken as an account of Dasein’s Being-in-the-
world. Heidegger intends this term to be philosophically loaded: the hyphens serve to 
suggest that world and Being cannot be separated, and should not be conceived of as two 
 
29 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.34 sz.13. 
30 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.37 sz.16. 
31 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.38 sz.17. 
32 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 225 sz.181. 
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independent entities, but instead, they arise through and with one another. An exploration 
into Being-in-the-world, and the terms associated with it will be instrumental in uncovering 
the hidden depths of Dasein, and being. In the following sections I aim to explain: 
Heidegger’s presented modes of encounter, Being-with, temporality, and then ending with 
Heidegger’s concept of authenticity and totality.  
 
Modes of encounter 
Practical involvement with things is taken to be the most basic characterization of 
Dasein in average everydayness. Heidegger refers to a hammer as an example of practical 
engagement, however he also refers to the sun as a tool (something that helps us to realise 
our purpose), therefore this practical engagement with things is to be taken in the broadest 
sense.33  
Heidegger uses the word equipment to pertain to the entities that we practically engage 
with: “We shall call those entities which we encounter in concern “equipment”.”34 In our 
average everydayness we encounter equipment all the time, whether it is for working, 
cooking, writing, researching etc.35 Heidegger defines equipment as “…essentially 
something in-order-to.”36. In this way, objects that we can engage with are viewed as 
serving some kind of equipmental purpose to us, an object that we can use to some form of 
end.  
Entities that are encountered as equipment have their own special sort of being: “The 
kind of Being which equipment possesses – in which it manifests itself in its own right – we 
call “readiness-to-hand”.”37 One can only understand an entity’s’ readiness-to-hand by 
practically engaging with it, it cannot be uncovered theoretically, or just by looking at its 
appearance.38 Heidegger’s primary aim here is to demonstrate that the world is first and 
foremost revealed and accessed when interpreted from this engaged perspective. The 
original basis of world disclosure is through significance, not pure representation. Having 
said that, if one later acquires quite an abstract interest, for example, what state glass is in 
 
33 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.98 sz.69. 
34 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.97 sz.68. 
35 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.97 sz.68. 
36 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.97 sz.68. 
37 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.98 sz.69. 
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before it becomes a solid, then adopting a maximally dis-engaged present-at-hand 
perspective is best. The claim is that this could never exist in absolute purity. 
While engaged in seamless activity, Dasein has no conscious experience of the 
equipment’s readiness-to-hand, it is inconspicuous. It would take one to stand back and 
reflect on the equipment in order to recognize the readiness-to-hand of the entity.39 For 
example, while walking past a chair or even while sitting down on said chair, I’m not 
thinking extensively of how the chair that I am sitting on has its readiness-to-hand as being a 
seat for people to use so they don’t need to stand. I would have to consciously think about 
the chair and the purpose it serves to notice its readiness-to-hand.  
When the equipment breaks down, or can’t be used in the intended way, it becomes 
known to us as being un-readiness-to-hand: “When we concern ourselves with something, 
the entities which are most closely ready-to-hand may be met as something unusable, not 
properly adapted for the use we have decided upon. The tool turns out to be damaged, or 
the material unsuitable. In each of these cases equipment is here, ready-to-hand.”40 An 
example would be, I do not reflect on my skateboard when I ride it, and if I did happen to 
reflect on it I would be quite likely to fall off. In contrast, when something fails to serve its 
purpose, it comes to my attention, for example when my skateboard becomes damaged. 
The readiness-to-hand of the skateboard becomes known through its current, broken, un-
readiness-to-hand state. Usually, I become so absorbed in my activity, the activity of riding 
my skateboard, that I do not think of myself as a subject over and against a world of objects. 
It is not that there is no awareness from me at all but that the awareness that is present 
(Heidegger refers to as circumspection) isn’t subject-object in form.41  
In fact, Heidegger denies that our most fundamental way of encountering entities is 
characterized by subject-object relations. He suggests that when a mode of encounter is 
best described in subject-object format it is a derivative kind of encounter, it involves a 
move from readiness-to-hand to present-at-hand. One can think of present-at-hand entities 
as things- independent objects that do not directly have a readiness-to-hand. Entities which 
are structured as present-at-hand are entities which bear certain context-general or 
measurable properties such as weight, height, colour etc.  
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Heidegger asserts that presence-at-hand is not a primary way of being for things, some 
form of disorder is required to bring it about. This disorder can occur in three forms: 
conspicuousness, obtrusiveness and obstinacy.42 The first form has already been 
mentioned- when a breakdown occurs, the equipment becomes unfit for its purpose and 
conspicuous.43 The second form is when I have something in front of me which isn’t useful 
for my current purpose, some other thing would serve my purpose better, thus the useless 
thing becomes obtrusive.44 The latter form is when I have something in front of me but it 
actually gets in the way of my aim; it is an obstacle and thus is experienced as obstinate, and 
I need to get rid of it if I am to make progress in my current task.45 Heidegger states: “The 
modes of conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy all have the function of bringing to 
the fore the characteristic of presence-at-hand to what is ready-to-hand.”46  
The difference then between ready-to-hand and present-to-hand is that the ready-to-
hand is specified in terms of the purposes of Dasein, whereas the present-at-hand has 
properties, the specification of which requires no reference to the purposes of Dasein. The 
present-at-hand gives rise to the theoretical description of entities and the theorising 
posture of Dasein, which as we have previously mentioned is not how Heidegger believes 
Being and the world is best accessed and understood. The crucial point to make clear here is 
that Dasein is the foundation of the readiness-to-hand, and as Heidegger has claimed, it is 
the readiness-to-hand that first and foremost explains entities. This point really emphasises 
Heidegger’s project: that without accessing the question of the meaning of being from 
Dasein’s vantage point we will be missing out the fundamentals of Being, as Dasein best 
reveals being.  
 
Being-with  
 Heidegger wishes to distance himself from the Cartesian ‘I’-entity as to do so would 
be to conceive of Dasein as present-at-hand. In searching for a point of entry for an 
alternate answer Heidegger notices that equipment is often revealed to us as being for the 
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sake of the projects and lives of other Daseins: “When, for example we walk along the edge 
of a field but ‘outside it’, the field shows itself as belonging to such-and-such a person, and 
decently kept by him; the book we have used was bought at So-and-so’s shop and given by 
such-and-such a person, and so forth.”47 It is in this way that we can encounter others 
(other Dasein) like ourselves - through equipment.48 Encounters with others presupposes a 
being that can encounter others, thus, Being-with-others presupposes the possibility of 
Being-with; Being-with is the condition for the possibility of ontically being-with-others (a 
sofa doesn’t have this possibility or this structure).49 
Being-with is a primordial constitutive structure with several aspects. As an 
existential structure, Being-in-the-world involves Being-with-others. On the ontological 
level, just as Dasein is never without a world, so too is it never without others: “By reason of 
this with-like Being-in-the-world, the world is always the One that I share with Others. The 
world of Dasein is a with-world [Mitwelt]. Being-in is Being-with-Others. Their Being-in-
themselves within-the-world is Dasein-with [Mit-dasein].”50  One aspect of being-with 
(Mitsein) refers to the structure or relation between Daseins that allows them to encounter 
one another. For example, the way we experience others through equipment, as explained 
above. The second structure is Dasein-with (MitDasein), this denotes the shared condition 
of Daseins- their being-with-one-another, an example of this would be direct encounters we 
have with others, such as cooking with another person, being actively engaged with 
another. The third structure is the description of the world as a locus for Dasein with: it is a 
with-world.   
As Dasein we need to be inducted into a web of shared significances in order for 
Dasein to operate within, and to experience the world. Mitsein enables this induction; and 
this is the condition for world disclosure. If Mitsein is the condition for world disclosure and 
Dasein is essentially Being-in-the-world, encountering entities, engaging in equipment etc. 
then “Dasein in itself is essentially Being-with.”51 
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There is, then, no exit from Being-with, even when we are alone we are still with 
others.52 Although this sounds suffocating, this Mitsein structure does play a positive role in 
creating the background of shared intelligibility, that in fact lets us be fully human in the 
first place. As will become clear, Heidegger is also aware that there is something deeply 
problematic, and very unsettling about this mode of existence that Mitsein brings with it, he 
refers to this troubling Being-with as das Man. 
 
Das Man  
 For Heidegger, the Being of everydayness lies in Das Man; the ‘they’. This everyday 
way of Being is something that at times seems to be misguided and dire, and yet is an 
existentiale. Heidegger professes this general way of Being to be an unsatisfactory condition 
to be in.53 This condition involves fleeing and avoiding something about ourselves, as 
Dasein. Ultimately, his main complaints about the ‘they’; about falling into Das Man, is that 
it is dysfunctional, it lacks truth; and crucially, he states that Das Man is inauthentic.54  
 There seems to be two aspects to Das Man. The first aspect, is that it is an 
existentiale, and the second, is that it is also something that is to be avoided. Although this 
may seem to be quite contradictory, the nature of Das Man doesn’t have to be so. It would 
appear that das Man is structural and inescapable as tendencies, but that these tendencies 
have degrees attached to them. There is a natural propensity for Dasein to fall into 
involvement in das Man, and without it Dasein would struggle. For example, just to be able 
to use language relies on das Man. Moreover, as children we imitate, learn behaviours and 
skills through an involvement in das Man. It is important to understand that das Man isn’t a 
measurable entity, rather, it is an unclear part of social reality. Without such a social reality, 
language would be almost non-existent. Furthermore, without language we wouldn’t be 
able to articulate the world.55 Thus das Man is a necessary part of our Being-in-the-world.56 
And in fact, Heidegger doesn’t seem to raise a complaint against this specific structural 
aspect of das Man. He seems to stress the importance of das Man when he states: “Das 
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Man is an existential; and belongs as an ordinary phenomenon to Dasein’s positive 
constitution”57.  
 It would seem that das Man becomes harmful when Dasein gets ‘lost’ in das Man, 
and this happens when she attempts to withdraw from aspects of her Being that are difficult 
or painful for her to face. It is in this way that involvement in das Man can lead to Dasein 
becoming self-estranged. The “mineness” that is intrinsic to Dasein becomes lost and can 
remain hidden in her everyday Being in das Man. This involvement with das Man is a way of 
taking Being easy, a way of recoiling from (at first glance) troubling aspects of Being, and 
this seems to be understandable, but also negative for Heidegger.  
 There is another reason why das Man can be harmful: it lacks truth. The lack of truth 
involved in das Man revolves around language. Das Man is an essential part of our world, 
and our knowledge of language, however it can present a distortion of both of these.58 
Language is something that is constantly reworked- we only have to think of various 
additions to the dictionary that were never used hundreds of years ago to understand this 
crucial aspect of language. As each person acquires language she acquires the average 
understanding of it.59 It is an average understanding because it relies on no direct 
comprehension with the matters that the language is about. What we acquire is an indirect 
capacity to talk about doing things with things.60 In this way, Heidegger states, “What is 
said-in-the-talk gets understood; but what the talk is about is understood only 
approximately and superficially.”61. In average everydayness, then, Dasein has this indirect 
know-how by just knowing how to talk about it. Even when Dasein does have an 
understanding of something which is grounded in direct actions and abilities, she often will 
lapse back into an average understanding of it, so that if she wants a genuine understanding 
she must try over and over again to win it back - and this is something das Man does not 
lend itself to. 
 Another element that can be linked with self-estrangement is a sort of fascination 
with das Man. Dasein becomes someone who is trying to impress others, trying to share too 
thoroughly with others: “We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they [das Man] take 
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pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge; likewise, 
we shrink back from the ‘great mass’ as they shrink back; we find ‘shocking’ what they find 
shocking.”62. In doing so, being-with-others can decrease our competence over things. At a 
very fundamental level, language can help Dasein know itself better, as long as her aim isn’t 
first and foremost at sharing in them with others, then if the latter is the case, there is no 
place for self-understanding. 63 This concept of ‘chat’ or idle talk is all tied up with curiosity, 
ambiguity and fascination, concepts that will be explained in more detail later.  
 Das Man, although it has its essential components, is, for Heidegger, a form of 
inauthentic Mitsein: ““Inauthenticity” does not mean anything like Being-no-longer-in-the-
world, but amounts rather to a quite distinctive kind of Being-in-the-world – the kind of 
Being which is completely fascinated by the ‘world’ and by the Dasein-with of Others in the 
“they”.”64 More detail on authenticity and inauthenticity will follow shortly.  
  
Temporality 
For Heidegger, a central theme in the question of the meaning of being is time. He 
claims that it is time which provides the most primordial horizon for the understanding of 
Being. In this sense time is to be understood in terms of temporality, to which Dasein has a 
very close relationship; “Time must be brought to light – and genuinely conceived – as the 
horizon for all understanding of Being and for anyway of interpreting it.”65 Heidegger wishes 
to distance himself from the claim that time is some kind of thing, or container of things, or 
flow, which is the concept of time found in the natural sciences. He intends to work with a 
more practical conception of time. Thus, for Heidegger, time is time for Dasein to do 
something; to have projects; it is the movement through a world as a space of possibilities.  
For Heidegger, Dasein is essentially temporal. Its temporal character is derived from the 
three-fold ontological structure: projection, thrownness, and fallenness.  
Projection, also defined as ahead-of and ‘existence’, refers to Dasein’s potentiality-for-
being, its potential to carry out future projects, it is in this way Dasein projects its being 
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upon various possibilities. Heidegger defines projection as “possible way for it [Dasein] to 
be.”66 Projection thus represents the phenomenon of the future.  
As thrownness, also defined as already-in, Dasein always finds itself already situated in a 
historically conditioned environment- the world. In the world Dasein is, to a certain extent, 
limited within the space of possibilities that are in this pre-defined world it finds itself in.67 
Thrownness is the name for the characteristics of Dasein that are conditioned by its being 
situated within a world of pre-existent values and standards. It is in this way that 
thrownness represents the phenomenon of the past as having-been.  
Finally, fallenness: “…there is revealed a basic kind of Being which belongs to 
everydayness; we call this the “falling” of Dasein.”68 As falleness, Dasein exists in the midst 
of beings which are both Dasein and not Dasein. The encounter with those beings, for 
example the modes of encounter that are ‘being-alongside’ or ‘being-with’, is made possible 
for Dasein by the presence of those beings within-the-world. Fallenness thus represents the 
primordial phenomenon of the present.   
Dasein, and Being-in-the-world can be understood in terms of a dynamic relation 
between thrownness, projection, and fallenness. The structural whole is referred to as care. 
There are three more related terms that Heidegger includes in ‘care’. These are: state-of-
mind, understanding, and fascination. The dimensionality of care can thus be interpreted in 
terms of three temporal dimensions: past (thrownness/ state-of-mind), present (fallenness/ 
fascination) and future (projection/ understanding).  
Understanding might be best described as a kind of competence rather than as a matter 
of knowledge- it is a matter of knowing-how rather than knowing-that. An example of the 
sort of understanding Heidegger is primarily interested in is ‘Jane knows football’: Jane 
knows how to play football and knows how to play it well- thus she understands football. In 
Heidegger’s use of the term, “In understanding, as an existentiale, that which we have such 
competence over is not a “what”, but Being as existing. The kind of Being which Dasein has, 
as potentiality-for-Being, lies existentially in understanding.”69 Understanding captures the 
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sense in which Dasein is future-directed and aware of the possibilities open to him within 
the world. Dasein is ahead of himself in the world, and there is instilled within him a sense 
of what he wants to do, what he wants to accomplish. If this wasn’t the case than Dasein’s 
reactions to things would be mere mechanical, there wouldn’t be any deliberation, nor 
concern for his actions.  
For Heidegger, self-understanding isn’t just how well you know yourself, it is a lot 
deeper than that. Who you are is not a matter of who you say or think you are, but rather of 
how you live; which projects you choose to take up; essentially what you practically do with 
your time.70 Self-understanding relies on being to be an issue for you. After all, to be Dasein 
is for who you are and what it is to be human to be in question, and for those questions to 
matter to you. For example, being a cook, do I cook because I enjoy it, or as a means to an 
end; these questions are bound up with how my cooking matters to me. Furthermore, these 
questions, or for-the-sakes-of-which, or self-understandings are never social positions.  
Heidegger is asking us to think of ourselves as being our abilities-to-be, rather than our 
social positions, our physical characteristics, or our potential. For example, one can occupy 
the social position of being a mother, without being existentially engaged in being one, and 
reverse-wise, a for-the-sake-of-which is not the same thing as a social position. In order to 
be existentially engaged by way of being we must ‘press ahead’ into it.71  
Hopefully it will be clear why existence/projection and understanding (including self-
understanding) are interrelated dynamic aspects of Being-in-the-world: they both disclose 
the aspect of Being-in-the-world that pertains to the future. They both give an account of 
what it is for Dasein to be future oriented.  
State-of-mind or ‘Befindlichkeit’ can best be described as the state in which one may be 
found.72Heidegger claims that “Existentitally, a state-of-mind implies a disclosive submission 
to the world, out of which we encounter something that matters to us.”73 State-of-mind 
thus captures the way we find ourselves already disposed towards things in this way or 
that.74 The basic idea is that one is able to affectively register, specifically in a manner that 
motivates an action in response, when things are going well or badly with respect to them. 
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In this way there is a transcendental aspect to Befindlichkiet. It is a kind of affective 
registering that helps me gauge when things are going right or wrong, and in turn helps me 
choose and possess projects. It shows itself in how Dasein ‘finds’ the world, as boring, scary, 
thrilling etc. It might be useful to break down state-of-mind by phrasing it as a question that 
you might be asked- ‘how do you find yourself?’. In order to answer the question you must 
find yourself, find how you already are, find out how you feel, and then once you have 
looked into these things, you find yourself amidst the circumstances of your living, then you 
can answer the initial question. In this way state-of-mind relates to thrownness, because it 
too describes the temporal aspect of Dasein that is the past.75 Our state-of-mind refers 
directly to the historically conditioned context of which Dasein finds itself.76  
For Heidegger, the concept of fascination seems to be intrinsic to fallenness, and thus 
intrinsic to the present. In everyday terms ‘fascination’ would hint towards an interest or 
passion about something, it doesn’t necessarily mean something negative. Perhaps, the 
most negative way it could be perceived would be that the person who is fascinated with 
something is too fascinated with the topic, to the point where everything else falls to the 
wayside. It might be interesting to explore whether or not Heidegger has two ways of 
conceiving of fascination: a positive and then a negative definition of fascination. First, we 
shall explore what he means by fascination in the present. He suggests that Dasein becomes 
fascinated with the world, but in a way in which he is too fascinated, he becomes absorbed 
in it, and therefore lost.  
Heidegger claims that ““Fallenness” into the ‘world’ means an absorption in Being-with-
one-another, in so far as the latter is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity.”77 Idle 
talk, roughly pertains to conversing with others, in an unexamined way, about facts and 
information, while also failing to use language to reveal their relevance.78 An example might 
be a discussion about politics that is simply grounded in newspaper headlines, instead of the 
actual article: two people discuss what they assume is the primary argument of the piece, 
instead of reading, and critically engaging in the article itself, this in turn creates a discussion 
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which is unexamined, and far from facts and real information. Curiosity is essentially the 
search for constant stimulation and novelty, instead of belonging and dwelling in the 
world.79 An example of curiosity might be a person who loves to travel, but in fact what he 
really loves is being able to tell people where in the world he has visited, instead of enjoying 
the different cultures, traditions, and sights that he encounters when he is physically in 
these different places; he isn’t grounded and dwelling in the world, despite claiming that he 
is. Finally, ambiguity relates to a loss of any sensitivity to the distinction between genuine 
understanding and frivolous chitchat.80 One can just think of any conversation involving 
small talk or needless gossiping, both of which can certainly be classed as frivolous chitchat. 
All three aspects of fallenness involve a sort of closing off or sheltering of Dasein from the 
world through a fascination with the world. Heidegger describes this fascination and 
fallenness as inauthentic: “Dasein has, in the first instance, fallen away from itself as an 
authentic potentiality for Being its Self, and has fallen into the ‘world’.”81 If the average 
everydayness of Dasein involves a fascination with the world in fallenness, and this 
necessarily involves Being-with, then it is safe to assume that the average everydayness of 
Being-with is one of inauthenticity. It would seem then that thus far we have a rather 
negative, and yet necessary, definition of fascination. Perhaps later we will find a positive, 
authentic concept of fascination.     
 
At this point in our existential analytic of Dasein we have reached the end of Division 
One of BT. We have made progress in finding out the basic structures of Dasein/Being. 
However, further exploration is needed.   
 
Authenticity and Totality 
 So far, we have this idea of Heidegger’s concept of authenticity and inauthenticity. 
An idea that revolves around Being-with, understanding, fallenness and a fascination with 
the world. Essentially, so far, I’ve presented the version of authenticity that springs forth 
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from Division One of BT. However, this is not the full picture. In fact, Heidegger, at the 
beginning of Division Two tells us that the interpretation of the Being of Dasein which has 
been offered so far is restrictive in two ways, and that is Dasein’s “possibilities of 
authenticity and totality.”82 Division Two explores these areas. In this section then, I will lay 
out Heidegger’s concept of authenticity and totality.  
Thus far, Dasein’s existence has been understood in terms of thrownness, 
projection, and fallenness. The projective aspect of this structure means that at each 
moment of its life Dasein is being-ahead-of-itself, it is projecting itself onto the realm of 
possibilities, it is in this way that Dasein is incomplete- it is always ahead-of-itself. Death 
offers the end possibility, it completes Dasein’s existence. Therefore, an understanding of 
Dasein’s relation to death would make a crucial addition to the existential analytic of Dasein.  
A stark problem that arises is that the usual phenomenological approach breaks 
down when it comes to death. This is because we cannot experience our own death until it 
happens and then we are no longer being. A possible response to this problem could be that 
we can experience death through others. Phenomenologically we encounter death as an 
end in one sense, when our loved ones, or simply people we know or have heard of die. 
Therefore, death isn’t an alien concept- we have a slight understanding of it, even if we 
don’t have a full understanding of our own death. However, the problem is that 
experiencing death through others is just to experience Being-with as dead, which is still a 
mode of our own continued existence.  
 Perhaps another possible response to the problem would be to assert that Dasein 
can relate towards its own death as a possibility that is always before it, the fact that death 
is inevitable. Death, then, just is “the possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all.”83 
It is this awareness of death as an inevitable possibility that cannot become actual that 
prevents the phenomenological analysis from breaking down. The failure of the previous 
response to the problem highlighted the fact that in each instance death is inextricably 
linked to some specific individual Dasein, it isn’t an experience that can be shared. My death 
is mine in quite a radical sense; it is my death alone, when all relations to others disappears, 
it is the moment when I am truly detached from others: I am alone. Heidegger captures this 
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non-relational notion in the term ownmost.84 Once I take on-board the possibility of my 
own not-Being, my own being-able-to-be is brought into view. It makes sense that thinking 
seriously about my own death, my not-Being, can help inform me about my own Being, for 
example not only what it could mean to be, but also specifically what it means for me, for 
my own goals, aspirations, and moreover how I have been spending my time. My awareness 
of my own death as an omnipresent possibility discloses the authentic self, and my own 
totality.  
 Heidegger’s account of being-towards-death forms the backbone of a 
reinterpretation of the phenomenon of care (thrownness, projection, fallenness). Care 
becomes interpreted in terms of Being-towards-death, meaning that Dasein has an internal 
relation to nothing. Being-towards-death not only has the three-dimensional structure of 
care, but can also be realised authentically and inauthentically.  
Let’s begin with the authentic mode of being-towards-death. Given the analysis of 
death centralising around the fact of it being a possibility, the authentic form of projection 
in the case of death is anticipation. As has been described earlier, death is our ownmost 
possibility, in this way then being-towards-death discloses our ownmost potentiality-for-
being; we disclose ourselves to ourselves as the utmost possibility through anticipation. 
Anticipation views death as revealing Dasein’s uttermost possibilities. In anticipation, Dasein 
finds itself moving towards itself as its own potentiality-for-Being. In this way anticipating 
death can lead to authenticity. 
Death isn’t just disclosed authentically in projection, but also in thrownness. The key 
phenomenon here is the state-of-mind that Heidegger calls anxiety. Heidegger states: 
“Being-towards-death is essentially anxiety.”85 In the form in which Heidegger is interested, 
anxiety opens up the world to me in a distinctive way. When I am anxious, I am no longer at 
home in the world. I fail to find the world intelligible, as I recognise that there is no almighty 
reason for doing things, or set of rules that I must follow in life.86 Dasein finds this deeply 
troubling initially, but can face her anxiety authentically by recognising that although there 
 
84 “…death, as the end of Dasein, is Dasein’s ownmost possibility – non-relational, certain, and as such 
indefinite, not to be outstripped.” Heidegger, Being and Time, p.303 sz.259. 
85 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.310 sz. 266.  
86As Heidegger puts it: “…the state of mind which can hold open the utter and constant threat to itself arising 
from Dasein’s ownmost individualised Being, is anxiety. In this state-of-mind, Dasein finds itself face to face 
with the ‘nothing’ of the possible impossibility of its existence.” Heidegger, Being and Time, p.310 sz.266. 
 29 
is no one telling her what should matter in life, things still matter to her. Which must mean 
that she is the one that decides what matters to her, and which projects are important to 
her. There is something freeing in this, and also illuminating. Simply because, through 
anxiety we can learn about our Being, and the way that we can authentically be in the 
world- by choosing what matters to me, and taking responsibility for my choices. Anxiety is 
therefore one of the keys to unlocking authentic Being. Something I will explore later is 
whether or not anxiety could also be the key to unlocking authentic Mitsein.  
Thus far, Heidegger has interpreted two out of the three dimensions of care, in light 
of Dasein’s essential finitude- Being-towards-death. What about the third dimension, 
fallenness? Given that we are exploring a mode of authentic Dasein, fallenness doesn’t 
come into it. Fallenness cannot be a realization of this structure of authentic care, as it is 
essentially inauthentic. 
 A nice summary of Heidegger’s authentic mode of Being-towards-death is presented 
as: “…anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face 
with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concernful solicitude, but of 
being itself, rather, in an impassioned freedom towards death- a freedom which has been 
released from the illusions of the “they”, and which is factical, certain of itself, and 
anxious.”87  
So, what does the inauthentic mode of Being-towards-death involve? We can 
already guess that it has something to do with fallenness, average everydayness and the 
‘they’. In everyday Being-towards-death, the ‘they’ obscures our awareness of the meaning 
of our own deaths by de-individualising death. Heidegger explains, “In Dasein’s public way 
of interpreting, it is said that ‘one dies’, because everyone else and oneself can talk himself 
into saying that “in no case is it I myself”, for this “one” is the “nobody”.”88 In this way, 
Dasein not only becomes lost in the public opinion of death, but also, attempts to evade 
death. This can be interpreted as a further way in which Dasein attempts to cover up Being, 
and a way that everyday Dasein’s fallenness manifests itself. It is not exactly like I am 
refusing to acknowledge my own inevitable death, but rather that the certainty of my death 
is achieved by idle talk, which is of the wrong sort, idle talk such as ‘everyone dies’ is a way 
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of de-individualizing Dasein’s Being-towards-death. Furthermore, it implies inductive 
reasoning: I’ve observed that many people have died, it would seem that everyone dies. 
However, as Heidegger asserts “We cannot compute the certainty of death by ascertaining 
how many cases of death we encounter.”89 Thus to talk of death in this way is to 
misunderstand Being-towards-death, and to approach death inauthentically. Furthermore, 
in the face of death expectation seeks secure and stable relationships with others in the 
world of the ‘they’, again leading to a misunderstanding of being-towards-death.  
Another way in which the mode of inauthentic Being-towards-death is realised is in a 
modification of thrownness and projection. This is specifically through fear and expectation. 
As a state of mind, fear can only disclose particular oncoming events in the world, thus to 
fear my own death is once again to treat my own death as a case of death, rather than 
something that is mine. Fear is fear of something specific, particular and determinate.90 Fear 
has an object, and when that object is removed I am no longer fearful. For example, I am 
fearful of frogs. I see a frog on the path in front of me and I am very suddenly extremely 
fearful. However, once it hops away I am no longer fearful. In this way, fear is always 
directed at something determinate. Fear also produces within us a sense of bewilderment, a 
sort of ‘forgetting oneself’, which is detrimental to authentic being. This is in sharp contrast 
to anxiety, which is experienced in the face of something which is completely indefinite, and 
also reveals the insignificance of the world which allows for “an authentic potentiality-for-
Being to be lit up.”91- something fear seems to withhold. Thus, fear is a state-of-mind which 
is an inauthentic approach to death.  
The projective parallel to the fear-anxiety distinction is expectation-anticipation. 
Expecting death is to passively wait for a case of death. For example, when I expect a coffee 
to taste a certain way, I am waiting for that distinctive taste in my mouth, I am waiting for 
an actual event. In contrast, when I anticipate the taste of that cup of coffee, it could be 
said, that in a cognitive sense, I actively go out to meet the possibility of that taste of coffee. 
In this way, I am making it mine. By expecting death I am thus waiting for a case of death, 
whereas by anticipating death I own it, and in owning it, everything between now and it.  
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There is quite an obvious difference between authentic being-towards-death and 
inauthentic being-towards-death. The first involves an opening up, and an owning up to 
one’s fundamental being-in-the-world, and the latter involves a closing off, and fleeing in 
the face of Being.  
 
From the Inauthentic to the Authentic 
The basis of authentic Being is for Dasein to recognise her possibilities, including her 
own death, then to actively engage in those possibilities to create projects that she can 
earnestly participate in throughout her life. Authentic Dasein seems to be something of a 
rarity. After all, there has been the claim throughout that our everyday behaviour seems to 
involve inauthenticity. How is it then that Dasein can cross over from inauthentic Dasein to 
authentic Dasein? The answer lies in guilt and the call to conscience. These are the two 
concepts we will explore here.  
Dasein is able to correct the tendency it has to flee from itself by answering the call 
to its conscience. Heidegger is not concerned with the traditional sense of what a 
conscience is, i.e. the type that commands certain actions on particular moral grounds, for 
example the type conveyed by Jiminy Cricket. For Heidegger, conscience does not offer a 
specific set of do’s and don’ts, it is rather a more generalized form of such calling and being 
called upon.92 My conscience calls on me to make a more fundamental choice, and that is 
the choice of choosing. On this way of conceiving of conscience, my conscience addresses 
me at every moment of my being. The call to conscience is meant to be something that 
disrupts us in our average everydayness- it is supposed to pull us away from the 
unquestioning take we have towards Being and the world. It offers no particular blueprint 
for life; it doesn’t present me with various strategies for dealing with events. Rather, 
conscience summons Dasein before itself, allowing it to face up to its being.  
Furthermore, the call to conscience reveals to Dasein that it is guilty. In the ordinary 
sense of the term, guilty refers to something specific and determinate, I am guilty of doing 
this or that, and the guilt is conditional upon my having carried out a specific act: thus, guilt 
in the ordinary sense has moral implications. However, this is not the case for Heidegger’s 
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use of the term. It would seem that Heidegger’s form of essential guilt seems to be a 
presupposition for the possibility of moral guilt.93 Sadly, if you were thinking that this is 
where some Heideggerian ethics were going to emerge, then think again. Heidegger 
suggests that guilt points to a more general deficiency or disposition. That it is to say that 
we are guilty in our being because Dasein isn’t itself the basis of its own being.94 In the case 
of ontological guilt, being-guilty refers to Dasein being responsible for the being that it is.95 
However, Dasein’s being is defined by its Being-towards-death, therefore its ‘I am’ is an ‘I 
am, at some point, not to persist in being’.96 Perhaps it would be better to define 
Heidegger’s ontological guilt as “Being-the-basis of a nullity.”97 Perhaps even better: a 
thrown nullity: “In being a basis – that is, in existing as thrown – Dasein constantly lags 
behind its possibilities. It is never existent before its basis, but only from it and as this basis. 
Thus “Being-a-basis” means never to have power from one’s ownmost Being from the 
ground up. This “not” belongs to the existential meaning of “thrownness”.”98 That is to say 
that we are thrown into a particular set of values, ends and projects. We are unable to work 
back on the past, instead we are subjected to it, hence there is a nullity in our thrownness. 
This form of guilt then is Dasein’s being subject to demands that consist in who it already 
is.99 This kind of nullity limits my projection; it limits my projection for which I am the 
ground. Therefore there is also a nullity running through our projection. By choosing who 
we wish to be, by following certain values, and setting ourselves certain projects, we are 
inevitably not choosing other routes, as we are not able to choose everything. My 
projection limits me as well as identifying me.100 Heidegger is emphasising the fact that we 
are given over to the task of existing, placed in a situation which isn’t of our making, but 
from which we must choose how to live, and to do so knowing that I am a finite being. It is 
in this way that we are guilty by virtue of being human. Heidegger is also drawing attention 
to the fact that it is a problem for my being that who I am trying to be and that I am also 
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already just so.101 After all, Dasein is present and yet to be at the same moment.102 Despite 
these problems that occur because of our Being-guilty, and the (generally) negative 
language that seems to surround the concept of ‘Guilty!’ in section 58, Heidegger states that 
we can never overcome our guilt, in fact to dismiss our Being-guilty would be inauthentic, 
instead our task is to face up to our guilt authentically.103 How we can do that will be 
explained shortly.  
 It may be useful to show conscience, Being-guilty within the structure of care. 
Heidegger identifies the three elements of care as projection, thrownness and discourse.  
The third dimension, discourse, is an existentiale.  When care is realized 
authentically, Dasein experiences discourse as reticence: “…the mode of Articulative 
discourse which belongs to wanting to have a conscience, is one of reticence.”104, where 
being reserved, and ignoring the chatter of idle talk aids Dasein in hearing the call of 
conscience: “Only in reticence, therefore, is this silent discourse understood appropriately in 
wanting to have a conscience. Moreover, Dasein experiences projection onto guilt as a 
possible way of Being in which it takes responsibility, and recognizes the essential structure 
of the nullity at the heart of Being.”105 Lastly, Dasein experiences thrownness as anxiety, a 
state-of-mind that discloses the possibility of its nullity, and it’s non-existence- its Being-
towards-death. The unitary structure of authentic care is thus reticence, guilt and anxiety. 
This structure is understood as resoluteness: “This distinctive and authentic disclosedness, 
which is attested in Dasein itself by its conscience – this reticence self-projection upon one’s 
ownmost Being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety – we call “resoluteness”.”106 And 
resoluteness has the effect of extracting Dasein from the ontological clutches of the ‘they’. 
Therefore, the key to authenticity lies in resoluteness.  
 
Inauthentic vs. authentic conversation 
Here, I will go into further detail on the nature of an authentic discussion in general. 
Such a discussion is different from idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity. I suppose the question 
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then is, what, in general, differentiates an authentic conversation from an inauthentic 
conversation?  
Inauthentic conversation seems to centre around the idea that the conversation is 
about something that has been said groundlessly, has been passed on, and “amounts to 
perverting the act of disclosing into an act of closing off.”107 Inauthentic conversation 
doesn’t allow for new inquiry, or disputation, teamed with the groundless nature of the 
content; inauthentic conversation doesn’t allow for genuine understanding.108 This is partly 
because those that are involved in the discussion don’t fully grasp the concepts or terms 
that they are discussing, they are simply absorbing what they are told, and internalising it as 
their own idea or understanding. Moreover, the people in this discussion are not authentic 
Dasein, therefore, on a deeper level, it would be difficult for them to genuinely understand 
concepts in the conversation, as they don’t truly understand fundamentally what it is to be 
Dasein. Thus, inauthentic conversation doesn’t involve genuine understanding.109   
Authentic conversation, or at least authentic Dasein will involve reticence. Heidegger 
states, “…one’s reticence [Verschwiegenheit] makes something manifest, and does away 
with ‘idle talk’.”110 Now, reticence is often defined as keeping silent, and certainly Heidegger 
does refer to keeping silent, “Keeping silent authentically is possible only in genuine 
discoursing.”111 This could be interpreted as stating that authentic conversation is a form of 
keeping quiet. However, I prefer a slightly different reading of reticence, and keeping quiet, 
one that involves a reservation about speaking without care or consideration about what 
she is saying. I believe that you can still have an authentic conversation, as well as 
deliberating carefully over what you wish to say before you say it. Having the original 
German word here is invaluable; Verschwiegenheit translates to the English word discretion, 
hinting that my preferred reading of reticence might in fact be closer to the word discretion 
and reservation, rather than the phrase ‘keeping silent’.   
Authentic conversation would be the inverse of idle talk; it would involve critically 
examining topics, distinguishing between genuine understanding and superficial chit-chat, in 
order to reveal the importance and indeed relevance of the topic being discussed, through 
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dialogue and language. This wouldn’t be a form of curiosity, in the Heideggerian sense, as 
authentic conversation wouldn’t be for endless frivolous stimulation, but rather would be a 
pursuit of disclosing Being, and dwelling as Being-in-the-world, as opposed to being closed 
off from the world and Being. It is the type of conversation where ideas and norms will be 
questioned, for example a topic of authentic conversation might be, voting in elections. This 
conversation would involve every member carefully deliberating over how they feel about 
the topic; proposing (with discretion) their own opinions on the subject, that would 
hopefully be based on a well-rounded understanding of the subject; while critically engaging 
with the opinions of others.  
 
Where do we stand now? 
In Division Two, Heidegger has provided the reader with a fuller account of the 
existential analytic of Dasein. He does this by drawing on Being-towards-death and the 
altered structures of care which emerge from an authentic or inauthentic approach to that 
finality. This has supplied the reader with a useful way of viewing our own inauthentic or 
authentic approach to our finite Being. The exploration into this account, and all the 
concepts involved will aid us later when it comes to discussing contemporary British politics. 
Something that seems rather pressing for my project is an account of authenticity and the 
other. Lawrence Vogel’s The Fragile “We” will get us off to a running start on this topic.  
 
Vogel’s The Fragile ‘We’ 
 
Lawrence Vogel’s The Fragile “We”, is a presentation of three interpretations of 
authentic existence, that could plausibly be included, or at least alluded to in Heidegger’s 
BT. Vogel’s interpretations try to combat the critics that charge Heidegger’s account of 
authenticity as being morally nihilistic. I will explore all three interpretations below.   
 
The Existentialist Interpretation 
This account aligns itself with the view that Heidegger is primarily an existentialist, 
especially with regards to his account of authenticity. The interpretation draws on 
Heidegger’s authentic being-unto-death. Being-unto-death individualises, in a way that 
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never occurs in any other scenario. When Dasein faces being-unto-death authentically, she 
finds out what really matters to her, not only that, but what matters to her is her 
responsibility. In this way being-unto-death is world revealing, instead of troubling and self-
preoccupying.112 It would seem that morals, in this interpretation, would come under the 
questions, ‘what matters to me?’, ‘what do I think is good/bad?’, and because of this 
morality would become dependent on each individual person.  
Although this seems to be quite a faithful reading of BT, it also “looks one-sided”.113 
Not only that, but Heidegger himself rejects the label existentialist. He rejects the label 
because the idea that individuals are responsible for creating values and morals ex nihilo 
presupposes a kind of Cartesian dualism between object and subject that Heidegger’s sees 
his fundamental ontology as aiming to overcome.114 Vogel suggests that there is something 
fundamental missing from the existentialist interpretation, and that is authentic historicality 
and the authority of tradition.115 Therefore, the existentialist interpretation does not cover 
all aspects of authentic existence.  
 
The Historicist Interpretation 
The existentialist interpretation wasn’t, and couldn’t be, stretched far enough to 
cover the community, it seemed to be far too individualistic. This is where the historicist 
interpretation comes in. As Vogel states, “…the account of historicality shifts the locus of 
authority onto the inherited and shared past.”116 So, how exactly can this interpretation 
achieve that? It can achieve this because historicality is centrally based on Dasein’s 
thrownness. As Dasein, we can never simply create values and traditions ex nihilo, we rely 
on our heritage. Thus, we are somewhat limited within the space of possibilities that this 
pre-defined world offers us. Historicality refers to how we cope with our thrownness. 
Authentic historicality is when Dasein critically engages with her past and the traditions that 
have been handed down to her, and then goes on to hand down to herself the possibilities 
that have, in turn, been handed down to her.117 In this way, she isn’t simply taking onboard 
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her historicality without thinking about it, she is thoughtfully analysing her possibilities 
within this pre-defined world and choosing for herself the ones that are important to her.  
But let’s not view historicality as something that is, again, individualistic. 
Historicality, crucially involves a recognition of other people. Primarily, this is because our 
history comes from others; we are amongst other people when we enter the world. This is 
how we can have historicality and thrownness in the first place. Furthermore, our own 
personal fate is said to be tied to communal destiny and our own freedom is related to the 
freedom of others.118 This part in particular is worth unpacking. It is when Heidegger starts 
discussing fate that being-towards-death begins to connect to historicality. Once Dasein 
authentically realises her mortality she makes possibilities that were previously implicit in 
her historical situation explicit.119 This allows Dasein to have the possibility of dying 
fatefully, instead of blindly, because she has an understanding of what is urgent, important 
and compelling in her situation.120 Individual fate seems to be tied to communal destiny, 
and this is because our historizing is always a co-historizing. Vogel suggest that “If “fate” 
signifies the way Dasein takes hold of itself through a resolute relationship to the events of 
its time “destiny” signifies the essential connection between the individual and his 
community of people.”121 Surely, it is with this connection between individual fate and 
communal destiny that means that historicality has fixed the problem of the interpretation 
being too individualistic. It would seem that authenticity can be linked with the individual 
and the community.  
Part of Vogel’s project is to suggest an interpretation that allows for an authentic 
‘we’, but provides a way of reading Heidegger that doesn’t lead to evaluative nihilism. The 
historicist interpretation achieves the first part, but not the second.  
 
The Cosmopolitan Interpretation  
The third interpretation that Vogel presents is one that relies on authentic Being-
with-Others and the authority of the other person.122 I find this interpretation very 
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compelling, however it should be noted that this interpretation relies on a part of BT that is 
short, and quite under-described, thus making this interpretation probably more 
reconstruction than direct reading from Heidegger’s text.  
 Vogel starts by stating that “It [historicality] offers no account of the sense that all 
other human beings share in “our” destiny and that honouring this requires listening to the 
perspectives of others from beyond the horizon of my or our prejudices, of suspending our 
projections for the sake of others who may have been excluded.”123 Therefore, in the 
cosmopolitan account, Vogel aims to combat the problems that the historicist account left 
unsolved. Vogel hopes to present a reading of Heidegger that allows for the possibility that 
“…the authentic individual possesses a kind of moral conscience: a feeling not only of self-
responsibility but also of responsibility to others.”124 Vogel hopes to achieve this by drawing 
attention to Heidegger’s concept of liberating solicitude.  
Liberating solicitude emerges from authentic Being-towards-death. Initially this 
seems surprising because being-towards-death appears to individualise, however Vogel 
suggests that although Dasein faces death alone without any support from others, it doesn’t 
actually isolate her from others but enables a sort of relationship to them (liberating 
solicitude), that only becomes available within the framework of authenticity.125 In 
liberating solicitude I am letting the other be, I’m not actively helping her with her projects, 
I’m not interfering in her freedom, rather I am letting her work it all out for herself. 
Liberating solicitude is thus leaping-ahead, it also means becoming the conscience of 
another.126 Becoming the conscience of another doesn’t sound like Dasein is letting the 
other be, however by becoming the conscience of another I can help the other face her own 
anxious self-responsibility, I actually help to heighten her awareness that her possibilities 
are ultimately for her to choose and resolve upon alone.127 It is worth saying that it is only 
when the other wants to have a conscience, and is ready for anxiety that they will hear the 
call, but Dasein can play a special role by provoking the other to listen. This sort of 
relationship is similar to, for example, the relationship between a good parent and their 
child. The good parent will want to help their child when they can but ultimately the 
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parents’ role is to prepare the child for life in the world, when they have to fend for 
themselves. The child might never be able to develop resilience and good problem-solving 
skills if the parent didn’t set a good example, and let the child make her own mistakes.  
For Vogel, the crux of an authentic ‘We’, and thus the crux of the his cosmopolitan 
interpretation is, “We coexist authentically and so form an “authentic We” when each feels 
that he belongs to a common project yet encourages the others to pursue the project in a 
way that attests to their own individuality.”128 This interpretation would seem to be the one 
that would lend itself well to an account of how we should interact with others, specifically 
within a community of people, and wider communities. Once we recognise people as 
possibilities in themselves, as people who are Being-in-the-world in their own right, instead 
of just things that we encounter, we can start to sympathise and thus work with others, and 
not just others that we identify with.  
 
Where do we stand now? 
Vogel’s three interpretations provide the reader with three ways in which one can 
read Heidegger’s account of the authentic person and the authentic people. In my eyes, 
there are elements of the three interpretations that work well. The existentialist 
interpretation has elements that seem to ring true within BT, such as the idea that Being-
towards-death individualises. The idea of co-historizing that we gain from the historicist 
account, means we don’t become too isolated from others.  Moreover, liberating solicitude 
pushes our community further, so we can include others who might not have the same 
historical context as me. These elements of Vogel’s interpretations provide a useful 
foundation for authentic Mitsein.  
 
One thing that I found particularly interesting was located in the cosmopolitan 
interpretation. Vogel suggested that individuation is the condition of our being authentically 
brought together.129 This individuation relies on anxious Dasein. Is there a way then that we 
can delve further into anxiety in order to show that alongside liberating solicitude we can 
have liberating anxiety? This is something I hope to explore further in my section Authentic 
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Mitsein. Said section will draw on a lot of Vogel’s ideas so as to produce my own 
interpretation of the authentic, albeit fragile, ‘We’.  
 
Authentic Mitsein  
  
 In BT, one can generally draw up a picture of what it is to be authentic and 
contrastingly what it is to be inauthentic, according to Heidegger. However, there is 
something I find lacking in his account, and that is authentic Mitsein. This lack is surprising, 
partly because of the emphasis that Heidegger puts on Mitsein. He states, “…the world is 
always the One that I share with others. The world of Dasein is a with-world. Being-in is 
Being-with-others.”130 It would seem necessary for Heidegger to provide, not only an 
account of inauthentic Mitsein, but also authentic Mitsein.  
 In this section I hope to offer my own reconstruction of Heidegger’s thoughts in 
order to accommodate for such a modification. Ultimately I will be focussed on drawing out 
the concept of authentic Mitsein that I believe to be hinted at, but overlooked in BT.  With 
my aim being to set the groundwork for authentically engaging with others.  
 
Why anxiety? 
I suppose the question is why anxiety; why is it important for anxiety and Mitsein to 
be combined? For me, the answer is relatively simple. Anxiety opens up the possibility of 
authentic Dasein. When Dasein experiences an intense bout of anxiety, she is undergoing a 
personal transformation, one which tears her away from falling, and allows her to realise 
the capacity for authenticity.131 Anxiety is the key in starting to unlock and acknowledge 
authenticity. Without it, authentic Dasein seems to be out of reach. Anxiety is thus a crucial 
concept for Heidegger. If anxiety is the door to authenticity, it might follow that anxiety 
could advance a form of authentic Mitsein, one in which Mitsein doesn’t have to be falling. 
Dasein is also ontologically Mitsein, therefore I must also be Mitsein when I am authentic. 
Anxiety can be authentically experienced by Dasein, therefore it should follow that there 
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must be some kind of connection between Mitsein and anxiety. I shall call this authentic 
anxiety, with regards to Mitsein, co-anxiety.  
Anxiety individualises, it is objectless, highlighting the ‘nothingness’ of one’s own 
existence; anxiety discloses Dasein’s responsibility and freedom.132 It would seem then that 
it would be difficult to comprehend anxiety as a group. When I say that anxiety 
individualises it could mean that one faces anxiety alone, and from it one then focuses on 
their projects alone. Certainly, there is a sense in which this is correct. After all, it is 
necessary to recognise our own freedom and responsibility in order to be authentic Dasein. 
On the other hand, this doesn’t necessarily mean that we are cut off forever, in our anxiety. 
Another element of anxiety individualising, and one I believe can work alongside the above 
reading, is that it individualises by lifting Dasein out of the inauthentic Das Man, and 
potentially opening up the possibility for authentic Mitsein as well as authentic Dasein. 
Authentic co-anxiety in Das Man seem impossible, simply because Das Man is a form of 
inauthentic being with others, thus co-anxiety, a form of authentic being-with-others, would 
be unlikely to occur in Das Man.  However, that doesn’t mean that authentic co-anxiety in 
Mitsein is. So, what form could it take, and more specifically how could we achieve this? In 
this section I will explore the possible answers to these questions.  
 
Co-anxiety 
 It could be that authentic co-anxiety within Mitsein is more subtle than we realise. If 
authentically realising anxiety allows for authentic Dasein, then it should also allow for 
authentic Mitsein. Authentically realising anxiety is a necessary condition for those that 
have authentically chosen projects. In authentic anxiety I realise that there is nothing ‘out 
there’ that grounds my projects, however I still look to embrace projects as part of my 
chosen developing identity. If I am embracing a project, then I am necessarily embracing 
something that is shared. In the sense of presupposing a shared meaning and significance. 
In order to embrace my chosen project I must embrace it as shared. Since this has come 
about through anxiety means co-anxiety.  As long as Dasein have recognised anxiety 
authentically than co-anxiety, and thus authentic Mitsein is possible.  
 
 
132 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.233 sz.188. 
 42 
It would seem that co-anxiety would work best when both parties had authentically 
realised anxiety. Again, phenomenologically speaking, this could be possible; I could discuss 
authentic anxiety, and what it means to authentically recognise anxiety, with someone who 
also understands what the term ‘authentic anxiety’ means. If both parties have experienced 
anxiety, and then recognised its ownmost potentiality-for-Being and have not sunk back into 
the world dictated to by the ‘they’, intuitively an authentic discussion of anxiety between 
both parties could occur. After all, surely Heidegger would argue that at the very least he 
presented anxiety in an authentic light in BT. If he has the ability to write about anxiety 
without it necessarily being inauthentic then I would argue that those who have 
experienced, and recognised anxiety authentically could certainly discuss it authentically 
between themselves. Furthermore, if both parties had authentically realised anxiety then it 
would seem unlikely that the discussion between them about anxiety could turn into a form 




So, we have an account of co-anxiety that leads to authentic Mitsein. Although there 
is not much textual evidence for this account in BT, perhaps there is other evidence that 
could back up my general project to propose a form of authentic Mitsein, as well as allowing 
for co-anxiety. This comes in the form of co-historizing. This account of authentic Mitsein 
will be familiar to you under the term ‘The Historicist Interpretation’ that Vogel presents.  
One of the biggest benefits of co-historizing is simply that Heidegger himself 
suggests a form of authentic Mitsein. The fact that authentic Mitsein is possible, and has 
been proposed in BT, provides more wiggle-room for other forms of authentic Mitsein to 
follow, such as co-anxiety. Additional ways of conceiving of authentic Mitsein within the 
framework of BT could follow quite logically from Heidegger’s explicit form of authentic 
Mitsein, within the context of historizing.  
 
Where do we stand now? 
I have matched authentic co-anxiety with co-historizing as my foundation for 
authentic Mitsein. Paired with Vogel’s account, we could have liberating co-historizing and 
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authentic co-anxiety in hand with liberating solicitude; revealing a well-rounded authentic 
form of Being-with-others.  
So far we have an account that allows for authentic Mitsein, an account that can 
provide us with a way of seeing our interactions with others as a positive. This 
reconstructed account is something that relies on being-towards-death, co-historizing, 
liberating solicitude, and co-anxiety. Although this provides us with a way of viewing Dasein 
within the structure of Mitsein, it doesn’t denote a way of life that can aid us when we 
discuss politics in more detail- an ethos of some kind is wanting. Of course, a Heideggerian 
ethos would be ideal. Something of this sort is presented by Werner Marx, in Towards a 
Phenomenological Ethics. 
 
Werner Marx’s Phenomenological Ethics 
 
Werner Marx took over Heidegger’s chair at Freiburg in 1976, and would later set 
out to construct a phenomenological ethics, that draws heavily on Heideggerian concepts. 
Thus, it is fair to say that his ‘ethos’ could be viewed as a Heideggerian reconstruction, an 
ethical follow-up to Heidegger’s BT. Like Heidegger before him, Marx is wishing to move 
away from traditional metaphysics, thus labelling his ethics as non-metaphysical.  
 
From Sociality and Mortality to Compassion 
Marx is primarily concerned with the possibility of the transformation of ethical 
bearing on the basis of an experience that results from emotion and thus plays a role in the 
formation of virtues.133 He begins by questioning how it can be that a person who 
experiences his own mortality and sociality can suddenly become aware of his responsibility 
and gain the virtue of compassion.134 He suggests that people are generally indifferent 
towards each other, and that in our everyday living we are in a sort of imprisonment, as we 
are isolated from others.135  
Marx presents two examples as to how the capacity for compassion might arise: 
mortality and sociality. Mortality: the attunement of horror can bring us before our 
 
133 ‘Emotion’ here could also be called the Heideggerian concept, attunement.  
134 Werner Marx, Towards a Phenomenological Ethics: Ethos and the Life-World, (State University of New York 
press, Albany: 1992) p.33. 
135 Marx, p.33. 
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mortality, as it can displace us from all of our habits and set opinions, and thus can set us off 
on a path on which any indifference is dissolved. Note that this is not rationality but an ever-
increasing emotion (horror) accompanied by a pre-predicative ‘understanding’ that doesn’t 
proceed by discursive inference though it still belongs to reason.136 Sociality also makes up 
our Being: in the face of total extinction Marx says that the attunement of horror can not 
only overcome indifference, but can lead us to an appropriation of social virtue.137 He also 
adds that given we are in a state based on freedom and law, our rationality does also play a 
part.138 It is key here to acknowledge the way that Marx is using the concept ‘rationality’. 
For Marx, rationality refers to a kind of pre-reflective immediate practical insight that one 
gets in a particular situation which actualises itself in an appropriate reaction. In this sense 
rationality is an insight that guides our attunement.139  
Mortality is a key part to Marx’s ethics, therefore it is worth deliberating over it 
further.140 Marx suggests that attunement issued from our own mortality is not only 
disclosing and concealing, but also has the power to lead us off on a path that leads to the 
‘old virtues’.141 The ‘old virtues’ seem to be those of compassion and community, a sense of 
caring for others. He suggests that in the face of our mortality we recognise, in horror, that 
we are fragile, that we are forlorn.142 Through this displacement we begin to yearn for 
community. My indifference towards others changes, they become ‘others of myself’, not 
only am I able to see the other, but I can also hear his call. Marx states that this 
transformation hasn’t come about through the power of thought, nor through the work of a 
dialectical concept; but rather it is a transformation which has come about in my emotional 
life; my attunement.143 
 
Sympathising-with 
 Marx introduces a new type of Being-with, which he calls sympathising-with. This 
concept can be understood in the everyday sense of the word, a feeling of understanding 
 
136 Marx, p.41. 
137 Marx, p.41. 
138 Marx, p.41. 
139 Marx, p.41. 
140 It might be worth viewing it as similar to Heidegger’s authentic Being-towards-death. 
141 Marx, p.47. 
142 Marx, p.47. Note that this feeling of horror is not Heidegger’s anxiety in the face of death. 
143 Marx, p.51. 
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between people.144 Marx suggests that it can be incorporated into the existential analytic. 
This is because he states that only sympathising-with grounds true intersubjectivity.145 So in 
this sense, sympathising-with, at least for Marx, is an a priori condition of authentic 
intersubjectivity. He goes as far to say that the measure of compassion is, in some part 
based on our ability to sympathise with the other. Just as Befindlichkeit is the a priori 
transcendental condition for mood, so sympathising-with is for intersubjectivity. This 
sympathising attunement can even transform the other: person B can be aided in her 
transformation to a compassionate person, because of person’s A compassion towards her. 
It discloses the attunement of compassion to the other. It would seem then, that 
compassionate behaviour has a knock-on effect, which of course, does make sense, often 
when somebody carries out a compassionate action, others might in turn be moved to 
become more compassionate.  
It might be useful to frame Marx’s sympathising-with in more Heideggerian terms. It 
would seem to me that sympathising-with has a very similar effect as leaping-ahead does. 
After all, both are able to encourage the other to become more compassionate/authentic 
without taking the responsibility or choice away from the other. Neither are enforcing 
authenticity or compassion on the other. Moreover, sympathising-with and leaping-ahead 
are both able to create a space which not only allows the other to freely become authentic, 
but also incites authenticity within the realm of intersubjectivity. I suppose the main 
difference between the two is that sympathising-with is an a priori condition for 
compassion, whereas leaping-ahead is not, which seems to give sympathising-with more 
gravitas.  
Sympathising is such a common way of connecting with other people: feeling sorry 
for someone because you understand the feeling that they are experiencing is a normal way 
of interacting with others, and can often help cement relationships. After all, as Marx has 
recognised, sympathy often leads to compassion. In contrast, lack of sympathy for others 
can in fact isolate you, and can actually aid in the breaking down of relationships. Therefore, 
perhaps sympathising-with is actually the a priori condition for compassion. This realisation 
is something that will be useful when deliberating over intersubjectivity within politics.  
 
144 Marx, p.54. 
145 Marx, p.59. 
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An idea I would like to entertain further is, could it not be the case that co-anxiety 
fits quite nicely alongside sympathising-with? If it is possible that we can experience a form 
of co-anxiety, which in turn has the potential to bond people together, then presumably 
sympathising-with would come into play: I experience anxiety, then co-anxiety with another 
person, this leads to me sympathising with the other, as I know how she feels, I recognise 
that her anxiety is similar to mine: it has displaced us. This then leads to compassion from 
me, and also from her as she can recognise that we are sharing an emotion / attunement. 
Although Marx uses the word horror, I would argue that his definition of horror (as has been 
presented above) is more or less the same as Heidegger’s use of the word anxiety, thus it is 
possible to give an account that incorporates sympathising-with and co-anxiety.  
 
Healing Force 
Marx references a ‘healing force’, as the disclosed possibility of the capacity for 
compassion, this is because he claims it works in a ‘giving’ sort of manner. He goes on to 
suggest that it is with the experience of ‘nearness’ of other people that the healing force of 
compassion grows. This seems to be, quite literally, having people close to you, seeing and 
hearing them often. It is in this nearness that we get to know the other, but also the “true 
regard for oneself” grows.146 Marx suggests that the healing force is absolute and absolutely 
certain; “this absoluteness and this certainty also ground the decisive essential feature of 
the nonmetaphysical essence of measure: its binding force which is valid for all cases.”147 
 
Four Stages to Ethics 
 It would seem then, that in its reduced form, Marx’s phenomenological ethics has 
four stages to it: (first stage) we are in a state of average indifference when it comes to 
interacting with others, (second stage) displacement when faced with our own mortality, 
(third stage) we identify with others as sharers in the same fragile and uncertain fate, 




146 Marx, p.63. 
147  Marx, p.64. 
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Compassion as Measure 
There is a further and important step to Marx’s ethics: compassion becomes the 
measure for the individual. This part of Marx’s ethos draws on sociality, and also on Hegel: 
namely the relation of one individual to another, and the relation of one to ‘we’, with 
regards to freedom. He constructs a path, one in which transforms man and his sociality. 
First, comes a “generalisation of all that which comportment in the life-world has 
sedimented in the form of norms of self-interest.”148Any ‘selfish’ actions or norms would 
have to be transformed into an attitude that serves the collective – hence generalising. 
Secondly, “the attuned intuitive-rational seeing of what community really is and the 
correlative hearing of its claims would have to be one of interiorization.”149Both of these 
steps would contribute to the possibility of a person leading their life oriented towards 
compassion, and that ultimately compassion would be the measure for the individual; acting 
in reference to compassion in a consistent manner.  
So, an individual could be leading a life of relative indifference to those around her, 
then her own mortality stares her down, creates in her a feeling of horror. This attunement 
truly displaces her, makes her recognise her own fragility, she searches for a sense of 
community in those around her, so as to diffuse this feeling of horror she has. She begins to 
see the other as like her, just as fragile, and she recognises herself in the other. Moreover, 
she shows compassion to the other, as she knows that they can also feel this horror at their 
own mortality. This in turn, can help the ‘other’ grow more compassionate, due to her initial 
compassion that she shares with him, creating something like a joining force, a ‘healing 
moment’. She becomes more aware of the community she’s in, the people around her that 
are not so dissimilar to her. She views her selfish, self-interested actions as just that, and 
tries to act in a way that benefits the collective, rather than just herself. This is because she 
is able to comprehend what the community/ the collective is and also what it needs. 
Furthermore, she is able to compare her state against others, using compassion, namely 
freedom as the measure of whether a state is good or bad. Therefore, out of mortality 
springs forth a phenomenological ethics.  
 
 
148 Marx, p.79. 
149 Marx, p.79. 
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Marx and Politics 
Marx suggests that we have to have order in society, laws, government in order for 
there to be a social structure. He claims that a welfare state would be able to satisfy man’s 
sociality, his essence. This is because it would create the external condition necessary, so 
that compassion could exert its influence in the social realm.150 Inherent in this welfare state 
would be the protection of people’s freedoms, rights, as a principle of equality, together 
with the principle of freedom.  
Interestingly enough, Marx makes reference to a ‘model’ in a similar way that Heidegger 
refers to ‘heroes’.151 He suggests that ideally the immediate models would be the civil 
servants that form the executive in the state. He believes that politicians, civil servants, 
protectors of the state should be models for other people to follow, that people should look 
up to them, and even aim to follow the standard that they’ve set.  
In fact, the political state seems to be quite important to Marx. He later states that now 
more than ever we should be a united people, and gives the example of the atomic bomb, 
and how we should be facing threats as a unified, cohesive whole. So, although he isn’t 
suggesting an ethos which is specific to politics, it is clearly an area he feels would benefit 
from such an ethos.  
 
One and the Many 
Something that is important within Marx’s ethics is that it doesn’t rely on an 
individual who is shut off from others, or even a group that can’t be individuals (das Man). 
He is keen to state that man has a two-fold way of Being: “man is a ‘one’ which is not 
closed-off with respect to the others and is nevertheless able to retain what is unique in 
him.”152 Marx suggests that the kind person would only ever see other people as fellow-
men, never as alien to her, only ever as people who are nearest to her. She can also 
recognise that essence lies in being in the company of her fellow men, without losing sight 
of her selfhood.153 This is a crucial part of Marx’s ethics, especially for our project. This is 
primarily because we don’t want to be too individualistic in our ethics, after all we want to 
 
150 Marx, p.81. 
151 Marx, p.82. 
152 Marx, p.136. 
153 Marx, p.135. 
 49 
allow for the possibility of authentic Mitsein. But we also don’t want to go too far the other 
way and create a Mitsein which is das Man in its nature. Marx has been able to create an 
intermediary point between the individual and the collective, one which allows for 
authenticity.  
 
Where do we stand now? 
Marx gives us a Heideggerian ethics which starts with indifference and ends with 
compassion. This is something that is going to be invaluable when we start to discuss 
politics, as indifference and indeed negative relationships could be said to be rife within that 
sphere.  
Now, let us recall Vogel and his ‘fragile we’. Combining elements of his existentialist, 
historicist, and cosmopolitan account seemed to create the best building blocks for an 
account of an authentic Mitsein. Then we explored anxiety further to potentially include a 
form of authentic co-anxiety, to further support the chance of an authentic Mitsein. As we 
discussed earlier, co-anxiety seems to fit quite well with Marx’s sympathising-with. Not only 
that, but in general, it would seem that Marx’s phenomenological ethics further balusters 
the claim that a Heideggerian reconstruction is possible, and that this specific 
reconstruction of a Heideggerian ethics would allow for an authentic Mitsein.  
This is all important for what we will explore next - politics. If we are wanting to 
construct Heideggerian solutions to contemporary British politics, we need to firstly check 
that it is possible. Part of that possibility was to determine whether Heidegger had an 
account of authentic Mitsein. Being with other people (in the normal sense of the term) is 
intrinsic to politics, so it was important to delve into a form of authentic Mitsein, and indeed 
to uncover an ethics that could be drawn from it. Now that we have an account of authentic 
Mitsein, and Marx’s reconstructed Heideggerian ethics, we are in good standing to begin 
exploring contemporary politics.  
Contemporary Politics  
 
Politics as of yet, has merely been sprinkled over the top of my explorations, a small 
addition but not the bulk of the project – this is soon to be rectified. All of this delving into 
Heidegger has not just been out of mere curiosity. My aim is to apply Heidegger’s 
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philosophy, and the Heideggerian reconstructions, to contemporary British politics, 
although it could be applied to politics more generally. This is all in the hope that some form 
of insight will be gained. I will begin by exploring some of the issues that I believe are 
prevalent in contemporary British politics, and then I will move onto the potential 
Heideggerian solutions to these issues.  
 
Problems within Contemporary British Politics  
 
 I will be discussing contemporary politics from the stand point of someone who lives 
in Britain and is engaged in the project of politics. In this way, my focus will be on 
contemporary British politics. Initially I intend to propose the main issues, as I see them, 
with British politics today. I’m going to approach these issues with Heideggerian-tinted 
glasses on. I will therefore frame the issues in terms of inauthenticity. This inauthenticity 
will be centred around the idea that today, British politics is very das Man in nature, to the 
point where our approach and engagement in politics needs to change.  
 
Relationship breakdown  
One of the over-arching issues with contemporary British politics seems to be a 
break down between relationships. At the moment it would seem that various forms of 
intersubjectivity have manifested themselves negatively, as das Man.  Whatever the 
specifics of the breakdown may be, many relationships have turned sour, and are not 
operating as well as they could be. Fundamentally, I’m suggesting that we aren’t viewing 
other people as like ourselves, we aren’t seeing ourselves in the other. In this way the 
wants, needs, and opinions of others seem alien to us. But not only that, by refusing to 
acknowledge the other we are not truly recognising ourselves; our own Being. We aren’t 
acknowledging a fundamental part of our own Being – our Being-with.  We have removed 
ourselves from the possibility for authentic Mitsein, and have found ourselves located in the 
average everydayness of das Man. This is problematic in the current setting as politics relies 
on people; it relies on people working together, communicating effectively, and discussing 
opinions. Thus, with a breakdown in Mitsein, comes a breakdown in politics. It is worth 
delving into this problematic area more thoroughly.  
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 The relationship between Members of Parliament and the voters has always, and 
presumably, will always be an interesting one. The voters rely on the MP that they 
collectively chose to honour their agreement, to fight on the voter’s behalf in parliament.  In 
the same sense, MP’s rely on voters in order for them to stay as members of parliament; 
without the support of the voters, MPs can’t get their foot in the door. The underlying belief 
here is that (in an ideal world) MPs want to help improve areas of government and politics, 
not just for themselves but so that the lives of others will benefit in some way. It could (or 
should) be argued that most people in politics, get into it with the hope that they will be 
able to make a difference and improve people’s lives. Surely then, a good working 
relationship is needed. There is a clear relationship then between MPs and constituents, a 
reciprocal one which also involves a sense of trust.  
Unfortunately, in more recent years there has been a growing sense of animosity 
between MPs and voters. In fact an opinion poll of British voters, collected in 2012 found 
that 62% of those polled agreed that “politicians tell lies all the time”.154  It would seem 
likely that either this percentage has remained much the same in 2019, or it has increased. I 
would argue that part of this assumption is based on the way Brexit has been panning out – 
which is badly. I’m not just referring to the recent catastrophic votes on many aspects of 
Brexit, but also the way the Brexit referendum was framed on both sides.  
The Leave and the Remain campaigns were fundamentally based on hypothetical 
eventualities, both sides have since been accused of running flawed and misleading 
campaigns. In fact, Boris Johnson has since been ordered to appear in court over claims he 
lied during the EU referendum campaign- he stated that the UK gave the EU £350m a week. 
Further examples include: the Leave campaign claimed that ‘The money saved from leaving 
the EU will result in the NHS getting £350m a week’, since, the UK Statistics Authority has 
stated that this claim was a “clear misuse of official statistics”.155 On the other side, the 
Remain campaign claimed that: ‘Two thirds of British jobs in manufacturing are dependent 
on demand from Europe.’, this was claimed after looking at outdated analysis, which was 
 
154 “Politicians ‘lie all the time’, says poll” in The Independent (5.03.12)  
(https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/politicians-lie-all-the-time-says-poll-7536473.html) 
[accessed 04.02.19] (para. 1 of 4) 
155 Jon Stone, “Brexit lies: The demonstrably false claims of the EU referendum campaign” in The Independent, 
(17.12.17) (https://www.independent.co.uk/infact/brexit-second-referendum-false-claims-eu-referendum-
campaign-lies-fake-news-a8113381.html) [accessed 04.02.19] (para. 5 of 16) 
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then used to compare two incomparable figures – it is said that the percentage is closer to 
15% than 66%.156 It is understandable why both sides decided to claim such things, these 
statements provoke a reaction. Using the examples above: for those who believe more 
money  should be spent on the NHS and not on the EU then voting to leave would make 
sense, and then for those who worry about losing their jobs if they work in manufacturing 
then voting to remain in the EU, again, would make sense. Both campaigns of course 
wanted to win, so naturally they wanted people to vote for their side. Sadly this provided 
the foundation for a lot of scare-mongering techniques, and a lot of hypothetical imprecise 
claims. For many voters then, the idea that ‘politicians tell lies all the time’ doesn’t seem so 
far from the truth.  
 Part of the issue with the above is that instead of treating each other as Beings, the 
relationship has turned into one similar to that of subject-object. We are viewing others in 
thing-like terms, instead of someone who is a fellow Dasein. The relationship’s aim was to 
serve a purpose, for example fair representation in the example above, however it has since 
broken down, the voters no longer feel like the MP represents their interests: therefore the 
relationship could be described as un-readiness-to-hand. The relationship has gone from 
ready-to-hand to unreadiness-to-hand. Not only is the breakdown in the structure 
problematic, but the way we are perceiving the structure/relationship is broken. The way 
we interact and relate to people shouldn’t be viewed in equipmental terms, we should 
instead be treating another person as a fellow Being who has their Being to be.  
 
Indifference 
 It could be suggested that we have a feeling of average indifference towards others, 
the kind that Werner Marx described.157 After all, if we’re truly honest with ourselves, other 
than family and friends, do the majority of people really care for their fellow humans, isn’t it 
true that generally we have a feeling of indifference towards others. It doesn’t necessarily 
have to be within cities where we see this indifference occur. It could be suggested that 
there is a diminished sense of community, and heightened indifference, even in smaller 
 
156 Stone,  (https://www.independent.co.uk/infact/brexit-second-referendum-false-claims-eu-referendum-
campaign-lies-fake-news-a8113381.html) [accessed 04.02.19] (para. 12 of 16) 
157 Marx, p.1 
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towns and villages. This lack of community and disconnectedness could be due, in part, to 
the easily accessible technology we have.  
 
Social Media: Disconnected yet connected  
Nowadays, we can limit our contact with people if we’re inclined; many 
technological systems are in place for us to be able to do so. Even people we want to 
interact with we tend to interact with in a disconnected way, for example messaging them 
instead of seeing them face to face. Of course, Heidegger has a strong distrust in 
technology, however this is not the stance I’m going to take. I wish to suggest that instead 
of using technology to enhance our way of interacting with others, and developing 
supportive community networks, we tend to use it in a way that would reflect das Man. For 
example, on social media, it is easy to get lost in the they, to try to emulate certain 
behaviours, activities, and even aesthetics. There is a sense in which a lot of people compare 
themselves with others on social media, to the point where it could be argued that social 
envy is rife on these platforms. Of course, it is still possible to experience these feelings 
when you’re face-to-face with an actual person. However, social media certainly 
exasperates, and helps cultivate these harmful feelings that ultimately can lead to 
diminished self-esteem. This isn’t obviously an issue for contemporary British politics, 
however it certainly has a knock on effect. If we are relying on social media for 
communication, friendship, perhaps even a sense of community, and yet social media can 
lead to social comparison and social envy, then no wonder we have a general feeling of 
diminished community. Social media platforms could be part of the cause and the effect of a 
lack of community, lack of cultural identity, and feelings of hostility towards other people 
(not just indifference). These feelings will quite naturally have an impact on politics. For 
example, there will be more of a demand on the political system to try to instil feelings of 
community. Or even that people are so focussed on what would benefit themselves, and 
the people they care about, that they vote for fairly selfish policies, even if others gain no 
benefit from their decision. Again it is another way in which contemporary society promotes 
self-estrangement.  
Another potential issue with social media is that it is a kind of confirmation bias; the 
apps or websites are coded so that they will display ads, or promote groups for you to join, 
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based on things you have searched for in the past. You can choose to follow people, 
hashtags, or groups who you admire – in this way you are manufacturing your own 
community of people who think in a very similar way to you, perhaps without even realising 
it. So every time you login to these social media platforms you are confronted with people 
who are confirming your perspective on things. Thus, social media is a kind of confirmation 
bias. For example, Emma voted to leave the European Union, many of her friends voted the 
same way; on top of that she has followed groups that promoted the leave campaign; 
moreover she has clicked through to a few Daily Mail articles so she is subsequently viewing 
ads on her profile that again promote leaving the European Union. In this way, her social 
media platform is confirming the way she has voted, because it is entirely biased. This way 
of advertising and marketing is probably not going to change, after all the websites want 
people to keep on using their platforms, they want the user to have a pleasant experience 
while using their service, therefore promoting things they show an interest in makes sense. 
If that side of it isn’t going to change then how can we begin to phrase an authentic solution 
to the threat social media poses to politics? In this way, social media seems to embody the 
spirit of das Man! 
 
Misinformation 
Another issue is that of misinformation. It isn’t simply that voters were misinformed 
by politicians but that they didn’t do enough to educate themselves on the different issues 
surrounding Brexit. This can be framed in terms of idle talk: conversing in a critically 
unexamined way. If more people had looked into the claims that the campaigns were based 
on, then the scare-mongering techniques and imprecise statements might not have made 
such an impact on the referendum. There is a sense in which people read the headlines, 
perhaps they might go so far as to read the beginning of the article, and then they form an 
opinion. Sometimes statements are questioned but often they aren’t. This is especially the 
case if the author of the article or post is someone that you admire. This way of ‘reading-up’ 
on politics doesn’t allow you to gather sufficient information. Moreover, the discussions 
that people were having, on the basis of this way of gathering information was in turn 
misleading, and allowed uninformed opinions to be passed on. In this way, the political 
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conversations that people were having were framed in terms of chit-chat and gossip, 
instead of informed, measured deliberations.  
So, although the tactics of both campaigns were misleading, the general public must 
take responsibility in some part for not fact checking and then basing their vote on 
something which was categorically incorrect, and in turn for the high levels of idle talk. One 
of the things that democracy relies on is voter engagement in politics, and that includes 
voters being up to date and in the know. If the voters don’t play their part, in a responsible 
manner, then the system begins to crumble.  
Having said that, it is difficult to decipher what is factual and what is merely 
speculative. This is provoked further by the ways in which information is presented to us. 
The media scoop up the aforementioned headlines, as they have a certain shock-factor to 
them. This is in the hope that the general public will buy their newspaper, or, which is 
becoming more common, click through to the website that provided the headline. The 
media is thus promoting the Heideggerian sense of curiosity and ambiguity. They are 
instilling in us this need for new information, and then providing the means for getting it: by 
reading their newspaper or webpage, by following certain accounts on social media etc. Not 
only that but the information we are receiving is becoming more ambiguous, meaning that 
we are losing all sensitivity to the distinction between artificial chatter and genuine 
understanding. This Heideggerian ‘fascination’: the demand to be constantly enthralled and 
entertained in one way or another, yet becoming numb to the facts, is of course damaging 
on many accounts. For politics, it means that people are either bored of reading about 
politics, that the political situation is ‘old news’, or they are unable to determine fact from 
fiction. Or as described above: that people are not spending the time to really read articles 
on politics and come to their own conclusions, therefore they are misinformed.   
However irritating it is that article headlines can be misleading, it is understandable 
as newspapers need something that will captivate the reader. The article may in fact be an 
informative, fair assessment of the political situation. This is of course the ideal outcome. 
Whether you agree or not depends on your view on whether the press reflects or leads 
public opinion. By simply delving into how right-wing or left-wing people believe 
newspapers are, I think it is fair to come to the conclusion that most of the time news 
companies have some kind of political agenda. Such a poll was undertaken, out of the eight 
mainstream newspapers, five were perceived as being right ring (The Daily Mail, The Daily 
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Express, The Sun, The Telegraph, and The Times), two were perceived as being left-wing 
(The Guardian and The Mirror) and one was perceived as being centre (The Independent).158 
Whether or not these publications are actually left, right, or centre doesn’t seem to matter; 
the news that we receive from them makes the public believe that they are. The alignment 
of publications matters because it greatly impacts upon public opinion; if there are more 
newspapers in circulation that promote right-wing policies and politicians, then it is likely 
that more people will see these and that those people may have more right-wing beliefs 
themselves. A fair representation of beliefs and ideas doesn’t seem to be reflected in the 
prominent newspapers in the UK.   
 
The Bubble 
Another kind of misinformation comes in the form of something I’m going to call an 
‘information bubble’. This occurs when you only have certain types of views, policies, or 
ideologies on your radar. This effectively blindsides us to the wider range of issues, and 
manifests itself in shocking results: e.g. the number of people who voted to leave the 
European Union was a shock to many of us. The information bubble in politics either lulls us 
into a false sense of security, or (for those who aren’t being heard) animates us to cause 
change and thus become heard. The political sphere can then become very volatile and 
unpredictable, which of course has knock on effects which are similar in nature. In the run 
up to Brexit, the polls showed that there was a chance that we would be leaving the 
European Union, however the majority of people believed that we would remain. It could be 
argued that this was because of the bubble the majority of us were in at the time. We 
simply couldn’t believe that normal, fairly average people would have very strong views on 
voting to leave, after all it seemed that the status quo was to remain – however this clearly 
wasn’t the case. We believed this because of the bubble. Clearly this ‘shock’ result has had 
negative effects on the UK: with people claiming that the UK’s economic growth has slowed 
while the rest of the world has recorded one of its strongest periods of growth in the past 
decade. I wish to make it clear that I’m not suggesting that it was the vote to leave the EU 
that caused the issues necessarily. But rather the issue was that the vote to leave wasn’t 
 
158 Matthew Smith, “How left or right-wing are the UK’s newspapers?” in Media, Politics & current affairs 7th 
March 2017, (https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2017/03/07/how-left-or-right-wing-are-
uks-newspapers) (Para 3 of 15) [Accessed 06.03.19]  
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properly considered as a possibility by many, therefore more thorough precautions were 
not taken early enough.  
 Not only can we see how the information bubble is misleading, but also how we are 
inauthentic. The bubble could easily be described as promoting the attitude that goes with 
the ‘they’.159 The media, politicians, general public, are getting lost in the they, simply by 
(even inadvertently) adhering to the information bubble they find themselves in. This is 
because they are only promoting or absorbing the views and opinions of those that are in 
their information bubble, they are blind to any other views. Or if we do acknowledge 
alternative viewpoints, then we are finding shocking what ‘they’ find shocking.160 As 
Heidegger himself admits, this is a normal everyday sort of attitude to have. Turning to the 
authentic doesn’t necessarily prohibit us from viewing things in this way, however it does 
promote an opening up not only to the other but to their opinions and their perspective, 
which is something that is wanting in contemporary British politics.  
 
Political Apathy 
There is a reaction to all that I’ve described above, one of engagement. The spark to 
try to instil some change in politics might be ignited. This is the ideal reaction. However, the 
general, perhaps more widespread reaction is one of political apathy. Statements such as 
‘what’s the point’, ‘my vote won’t make a difference anyway’, ‘ politicians will never change’ 
are definitely in circulation. Even if this is relatively close to the truth, it is still problematic. 
Political apathy traditionally does not help politics progress. It is only with an engagement in 
politics that change can occur. If the statements above have any foundation, then change 
does need to occur. Not only is it problematic in a political sense, but also by taking the 
viewpoint of ‘what does it matter’, ‘my vote won’t make a difference’, we are rejecting our 
responsibility and we are also denying ourselves the choice to engage in the project of 
politics. In this sense political apathy can be viewed as inauthentic, as we are ignoring our 
responsibility, we are allowing a big part of our lives to play out in front of us, without trying 
to take part.  
 
159 Let’s remind ourselves of Heidegger’s description of getting lost in the they: “we read, see, and judge about 
literature and art as they see and judge; likewise, we shrink back from the ‘great mass’ as they shrink back; we 
find ‘shocking’ what they find shocking.” Heidegger, Being and Time p.164 sz.127. 
160 Heidegger, Being and Time p.164 sz.127. 
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Where do we stand now? 
So far I’ve presented a few of the issues I believe we are facing in contemporary 
British politics. It would seem to me that these issues are off-shoots of the central problem: 
that we are disconnected from ourselves and from those around us. Or, as Heidegger would 
frame it, the central problem is that we are inauthentic. Luckily enough for us, there might 
be a way in which we can present Heideggerian solutions to the issues presented above.  
 
Heideggerian Solutions to Politics 
 
Something that has become obvious while working through the problems with 
contemporary British politics is that at the heart there is a deep-rooted problem with the 
way we view ourselves and the way in which we interact with those around us. It could be 
said that we are firmly located, and lost, in the ‘they’ of das Man. If the issue is in fact that 
we are interacting with one another in an inauthentic way, then we need to try to convert 
that into the authentic. This ‘conversion’ of sorts has been described above; if we recall 
Vogel and Marx’s reconstructions, and also the work we did surrounding co-anxiety. Due to 
the reconstructions and interpretations, we are able to suggest the general way we can turn 
the inauthentic into the authentic, and how we can measure this in terms of level of 
compassion involved. These are of course useful theoretical tools to remind ourselves of 
when we are generally thinking of how to act in politics today. However, they can be seen as 
quite abstract; the accounts don’t give specific details of how exactly to convert the 
inauthentic to the authentic in our contemporary political situation. It is still valuable to 
utilise the accounts we explored earlier, especially if we supplement them with specific 
ways of solving the above issues.  
Politics involves people. This is primarily why the break down in relationships within 
the political sphere is deeply problematic. It sounds all too easy to suggest that instead of 
treating one another as objects, or pieces on a chess board, we need to recognise one 
another’s agency. It would seem to be a case of ‘easier said than done’. This attitude is the 
beginning of the destructive perspective we have with regards to others and also ourselves. 
We view the other as someone that is alien to us; we refuse to recognise the fundamental 
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similarities. This is the view-point that many of us align with. The consequence being that 
we find it incredibly difficult to relate to others; to sympathise; and therefore we struggle to 
constructively work with other people. The jump from indifference to caring does seem to 
be a big one. Having said that, there are ways of narrowing the gap.  
Let’s start with the relationship between MPs and Voters. Both sides need to 
demand more from each other. Voters need to demand more honesty from MPs. MPs need 
to demand more engagement. These demands aren’t necessarily achieved by commanding 
it of the other side, but perhaps by taking action. For example, voters could write to their 
member of parliament, asking for their opinion on the current political situation with Brexit, 
they could become involved in debates and discussions whereupon they could question 
their MP. Vice versa, members of parliament could encourage engagement by presenting in 
alternative ways. For example: by hosting chats, informal or formal to allow voters to 
present issues they have; by trying to become a bit more at home with the people they are 
representing so that they don’t appear to be removed from reality. All of these are just 
relatively small changes that people could make to improve the foundation for beneficial 
relationships between MPs and voters.  
A fact that may help motivate people to start to rebuild relationships with others is 
that the current political climate is very uncertain. The whole of the UK has been placed in a 
position of deep doubt. The current state of affairs might actually help unite people 
together. After all, sometimes it takes a displacement before people are motivated to act. In 
fact, for Heidegger, we need a feeling of anxiety to truly displace us, before we can begin to 
be authentic in our Being.161 As has been mentioned earlier this Heideggerian feeling of 
anxiety displaces us in more than just the ‘I’m feeling uncertain’ sense- it individualises.162 In 
the same way, it could be argued that the anxiety we’re experiencing in the current political 
climate is also individualising. After all, it is forcing us to consider what is important to us, 
what our own individual beliefs, goals, and projects are, or should be. Contemporary 
Heideggerian anxiety does exist then, moreover, it is something we can utilise. Since anxiety 
draws our attention to what we find important, it would make sense that anxiety can help 
us work together, especially if individually we recognise the need to improve our political 
 
161 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.233 sz.188. 
162 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.232 sz.187. 
 60 
situation. Our co-anxiety will help us to work alongside one another, and that could mean 
between voters, between voters and MPs, and even between MPs themselves. In fact, at 
one point the high level of political co-anxiety caused MPs to take action, to try to find a 
better way of working together that they hoped would benefit all. For example, the past 
development in the House of Commons whereupon Members of Parliament decided to take 
control of the Brexit proceedings by voting on various different options. Although none of 
them were successful, it is clear that the worry and anxiety of Brexit forced them to consider 
what they viewed to be important, what they felt would be the best way of dealing with 
Brexit, and then they recognised that they need to work together by presenting different 
options. If we can join in solidarity in the face of the anxiety surrounding Brexit, then we 
may be able to work together in an authentic way. In this sense, we’ll be able to re-build the 
relationships that have become almost non-existent up to this point.  
In anxiety we are presented with a choosing.163 We make a decision about what we 
find important, and what we want out goals and projects to be. It would seem to me that 
politics could potentially have a massive effect on many people’s projects. Depending on 
political parties, policies etc. our projects could be hindered or developed. Therefore, it is 
logical that we take an interest in politics. Even go as far to make politics a project of ours. 
After all, in The Fragile We, Vogel stated: “We coexist authentically and so form an 
“authentic We” when each feels that he belongs to a common project yet encourages the 
others to pursue the project in a way that attests to their own individuality.”164 The 
common project of politics could unite us together.  
Conversely, it could be argued that not to get involved in politics would be like 
getting lost in the they; to have lost sight of our Being. In this way, political apathy, even if it 
is understandable (as aspects of das Man are) it is not to authentically engage in politics, 
and by becoming politically apathetic, we are ignoring our responsibility.  
The difference between the inauthentic mode of working together and the authentic 
is that before, in the inauthentic form we were using each other as tools to some kind of 
end. However, when we authentically interact with others, we are not only recognising our 
own Being authentically, but also that the other has their Being-to-be. I would suggest as 
 
163 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.310 sz.266. 
164 Vogel, p.79. 
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well that there is a mutual feeling of sympathy. Both parties in the interaction can 
understand what the other is going through, and can offer feelings of sympathy. This shared 
feeling helps promote a positive and productive collaboration, thus transforming the feeling 
of indifference to one of sympathy and compassion.  
If anything, the ongoing Brexit talks have instilled in us the fact that the future of the 
relationship between the EU and the UK is fractious. Perhaps that fact can help us see that 
since we are burning bridges between ourselves and other countries, that the time for 
indifference, or even squabbling between ourselves, is over. We must try to salvage 
whatever relationships we can in order to work together in this uncertain, and frankly, dire 
situation.  
The over-arching claim here isn’t that changing our ways of interacting with 
ourselves and with others from the inauthentic to the authentic is remarkably easy - this is 
certainly not what I’m claiming. Rather that the tools that we can utilise in promoting 
feelings of sympathy and compassion for others are already there in front of us. It just 
requires the individual to take a step back from their situation to recognise that the current 
political dilemma requires that we work with others. Not only that but our very Being 
requires that we are Being-with. By authentically recognising our own Being we are able to 
move forward, as authentic Mitsein to critically re-engage with politics. In this way, 
Heidegger can help provide a fresh approach to viewing ourselves and one another, 
especially within the context of politics.  
 
How to Behave Authentically  
In my eyes then, a Heideggerian solution to issues within politics begins with 
authenticity, and authentic Mitsein. The term authenticity not only includes other people, 
but can also specific ways of acting. This is an area I’m going to explore now.  
 
Authentically Discussing Politics  
Earlier, one of the issues that was quite striking within politics was that of 
inauthentic discussion. Democracy really relies on input from all sides, and ideally an input 
which is informed. The important concept Heidegger provides us with here is reticence. This 
is something I have mentioned earlier but will frame in the context of politics now. A 
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discussion about politics that could be deemed authentic would involve reticence. Everyone 
involved in the discussion would be quite deliberate with what they were saying, what 
would be discussed would be thought-through and would be considered before even being 
said. An authentic discussion on the current Brexit situation would involve people who have 
tried to keep as informed as possible; have deliberated over the issues involved; and then 
wish to engage with others who are in a similar position to them (an informed one). This 
discussion wouldn’t necessarily involve everyone agreeing on all the topics examined, in fact 
it may even be preferable to have controversial opinions, as it gives everyone involved an 
insight into a different perspective, which may or may not impact upon their own opinion 
on Brexit. The people involved wouldn’t just be swayed by what one person is saying; they 
wouldn’t automatically agree with someone because of who they are, but because of the 
substance of what they said. In this scenario, genuine Heideggerian understanding would be 
in play. This is because the actors involved wouldn’t be fascinated with the conversation on 
Brexit, as they would be if they were involved in a das Man-like conversation. Furthermore, 
by discussing political topics, we can in turn delve into what it is to be in the world, what it is 
to struggle with our own Being, and also what interests us. With this understanding of what 
is said, the people involved are able to leave the conversation with more of an 
understanding of a) the perspectives on Brexit and b) themselves and society. It is in this 
way that the authentic discussion on Brexit would instil in the actors a sense of belonging 
and dwelling in the world.  
 
Authentically Combatting Misinformation  
As has been touched upon previously, we need to be more informed before we 
announce our perspective on a topic to others. This isn’t just for our own benefit but for 
other people. A lot of people including politicians and celebrities project their case for or 
against something without really understanding the matter. It’s either a knee-jerk reaction, 
or something they haven’t delved into enough. More thought needs to go into what they 
are putting out there for the world to see. This is primarily because many people will read a 
post, a tweet, or an article by someone and believe it entirely, and absorb it as their own 
opinion. This is something that needs to become scarce, and this can be achieved by going 
to the source of this misinformation, and encouraging everyone to really think about what 
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they’re putting out into the world. This especially goes for people who wield quite a lot of 
power with a pen, or in 280 characters.  
Another way to combat political misinformation is to embolden people to go out and 
investigate; to look into claims about what the outlook might be if we leave the European 
Union – for example. This would involve a lot of questioning: of the claims, but also of the 
self; of our own Being. This questioning of our Being would come into play, because while 
questioning claims surrounding politics, we would naturally question whether it is important 
to us, whether I believe something to be true, whether contrasting opinions make it false. 
All of these questions would lead me to gain some insight into my own Being, and part of 
what it means to be Being-in-the-world – to be engaged in it.  
 
Authentically Engaging with Social Media 
In recent years there has been a definite ontological shift, and that shift has been 
instigated by social media. For our purposes I will be exploring the potential Heideggerian 
solutions for social media with regards to the political climate. If we’re being completely 
honest a true Heideggerian response would be to cut ourselves off from social media 
entirely, after all he already had deep suspicions about telephones. However, this doesn’t 
seem like particularly helpful advice, very few people would agree to that. So, the task at 
hand is how to frame the alternative to the current inauthentic way of engaging with social 
media.  
I suppose the key here with this kind of authenticity is authentic Being-with. 
Something that we commonly do within the realm of social media is to try to fit in, to 
conform to the masses. That may be with the pictures that we post, or even the comments 
we make. We put these things out into the world in order to get a reaction from others, and 
usually the one reaction we desire is that of a ‘like’, because we want others to accept us. 
This way of interacting with social media is very Das Man in nature due to the fact that we 
are getting lost in the social structure of the ‘they’.  A political example might be that for 
many university students it’s quite a ‘trendy’ thing to have an opinion when it comes to 
politics; to get involved in a political party; to take a stand on something political; or at least 
to document doing so on social media. Of course, some people will indeed have strong 
feelings about politics, and will be very engaged. Unfortunately, it could also be the case 
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that the vast majority of people are merely play acting at being politically engaged. All they 
really want is for people to think that they are passionate about politics, so they give the 
illusion that they are, and that is all that social media demands.  
We need to get back to basics then within our Being, we need to recognise our own 
Being-to-be, and that of others. This involves recognising that the opinions of others, 
especially as portrayed on social media, do not really make a difference. The attention that 
we want from others is actually superficial, and ultimately will not aid us in our conflicted 
Being. In this way we wouldn’t allow ourselves to get swept up in the herd of social media. 
We wouldn’t be relying on ‘likes’ in order to validate ourselves, or promote things, such as a 
certain political view, without knowing anything about them, just to appear ‘on trend’. We 
can of course still interact with others on social media; post things on social media etc. but 
the knowledge of our own Being can keep us grounded and authentic when doing so.  
Keeping informed of the potential confirmation bias involved in social media already 
means that we are one step ahead. If we bear in mind that this could lull us into an 
information bubble then we will be able to off-set it, by keeping ourselves open to the other 
perspectives out there. So if we find ourselves in a situation where our own political 
opinions seem to be reflected on social media, then why don’t we explore other angles. In 
this way we can balance out our own, sometimes self-inflicted, confirmation bias.  
In the section above I have outlined some of the problems I see within contemporary 
British politics, namely: a break down in relationships; the way we interact with social 
media; misinformation, and apathy. I have framed these problems in terms of self-
estrangement, the ‘they’, and indifference. I have then suggested ways in which we can try 
to combat these problems. All of these solutions lean on the Heideggerian framework of 
authentic Dasein. In this way, I have presented various techniques in which we may 
authentically combat the problems in contemporary British politics.  
 
Where do we stand now?  
Throughout, I’ve been assuming that people, in general, are looking to have a 
positive interaction with politics, that they are seeking out solutions to problems within 
politics. I’ve suggested that being authentic is key to that interaction. However, call me a 
pessimist, but there are many people within politics that could be viewed as acting in a 
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negative way, however for them it is a positive; they have no issues with acting negatively; 
in fact it could be argued that it serves their purposes better that way.  
Perhaps then it would be worthwhile to look into a way of sifting through those that 
are acting in good faith, and those that are acting out of bad faith. With bad faith here being 
those that are acting only in their own interest, to further only their own project. A 
diagnostic tool for those who are wishing to have a positive interaction with politics would 
be useful. In the next section I am going to suggest that recognition is the key to this 




In this section I intend to suggest a Heideggerian account of recognition. I will be 
utilising Lauren Freeman’s paper “Recognition Reconsidered: A re-reading of Heidegger’s 
Being and Time S.26”.165 In this paper Freeman explores S. 26 of BT, she suggests how this 
section can give us an account of recognition.166 Freeman’s paper will be the jumping off 
point for producing a diagnostic tool in which to distinguish between those that are 
politically in good or bad faith.  
 
In Section 26 there is an account of Being-with that encompasses the authentic, this 
is an account that focusses on solicitude. When discussing Vogel’s cosmopolitan account we 
came across the concepts involved in solicitude: leaping-ahead, leaping-in, and indifference. 
Freeman argues that these are also examples of kinds of recognition; that for leaping-
in/ahead or indifference to occur there is an implicit recognition at play.  
 
Recognition qua Leaping-ahead 
Leaping-ahead could be viewed as the positive way of recognising others. In leaping-
ahead we recognise the other as not only someone who has their Being-to-be, but also as 
someone who is an ‘other’; a self-determining agent, as we all are. Meaning that they 
deserve recognition and the choice to choose who they are, without other people getting in 
 
165 L. Freeman, “Recognition Reconsidered: A re-reading of Heidegger’s Being and Time S.26” p.1. 
166 Freeman aligns with Axel Honneth’s definition of recognition.  
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their way.167 There is a further level of recognition, which is that this other person is capable 
of choosing, meaning she doesn’t need others to jump in for her- to act as a ‘hero’. In this 
sense of recognition, we are recognising people in an appropriate manner which doesn’t 
paralyse ourselves or the other in a struggle for recognition. Not only that, but in leaping-
ahead we are also recognising our own fundamental Being: our care, Dasein as Being-with 
etc.168 In this sense, in leaping-ahead we aren’t just acknowledging that the other is a 
person, we are recognising something much more fundamental in the other and also 
ourselves, then we are acting on this recognition by leaping-ahead. Freeman suggests that: 
“When someone is recognised as capable of carrying out her own task or fulfilling her own 
role, her relation to the other in fact determines the possibility of both her and the other’s 
freedom and selfhood.”169 
 
Within Section 26 it could be argued that Heidegger presents us with an example of 
authentic Mitsein and positive recognition, within leaping-ahead. Heidegger suggests that 
“…when they devote themselves to the same affair in common, their doing so is determined 
by the manner in which their Dasein each in its own way, has been taken hold of. They thus 
become authentically bound together, and this makes possible the right kind of objectivity 
which frees the Other in his freedom for himself.”170 Something that initially sticks out in 
this passage is the idea that there is the potential for being ‘authentically bound together’. 
This ‘binding’ might be worth exploring. When we consider the word ‘bound’ it can stir up 
varying connotations: positive and negative. If we start with the latter: being bound could 
mean being tied to something whether physically, in which case being limited in action; or 
being bound to a promise, which hints at being limited in discussing certain topics. Being 
bound then can be limiting. On the other hand, being bound could mean something 
positive. It could be another way of stating that we are deeply connected with another 
person, that there is some reliance on the other in the relationship, and that isn’t 
necessarily a bad thing. It might be useful to refer to the German word here, in order to 
gauge which version Heidegger would align himself with here. When we delve deeper into 
 
167 L. Freeman, “Recognition Reconsidered: A re-reading of Heidegger’s Being and Time S.26” p.88. 
168 L. Freeman, “Recognition Reconsidered: A re-reading of Heidegger’s Being and Time S.26” p.92. 
169 L. Freeman, “Recognition Reconsidered: A re-reading of Heidegger’s Being and Time S.26” p.88. 
170 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.159 sz.122. 
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the word ‘Verbundenheit’ we can suggest that being bound to the other shouldn’t be taken 
in a negative context, as it can be directly translated as ‘connectedness’, ‘solidarity’, and 
‘closeness’.  All three of these words hint towards a positive togetherness, rather than a 
sense of being trapped. This ‘authentic binding’ then seems to be something that is 
harmonious, and would seem to aid both Dasein involved as it allows them both to be 
authentic in their Being. All of this matters because it adds weight to the theory that 
Heidegger has presented, not only a positive way of interacting with other people, but also 
a positive account of recognition. It could even be suggested that this ‘bond’, 
‘connectedness’ arises out of positive recognition. From this, it could be argued that 
Heidegger is stating that when we are able to recognise people for what they truly are, and 
implicitly recognise our own Being authentically, we are able to work better together.  
This way of working together can be observed within politics, such as when people 
work together to campaign in support of a potential MP that they believe would impress the 
right sort of change in parliament. This kind of working together is for a common goal, it is a 
kind of devoting themselves to the same affair in common. In their collective project of 
campaigning they thus become authentically bound together in a sort of leaping-ahead of 
the other. Not only is this a form of authentic Mitsein, but also an account of positive 
recognition. The people involved in the collective project are able to recognise the other, 
without reifying each other. They recognise the other as someone who is entering into the 
same project as them, so to a certain extent the other believes and supports similar things 
to them. Neither person is wanting to leap-in for the other as they recognise that the other 
deserves their choice to choose, and that their collective project will progress more 
successfully if they refrain from interfering with the other’s freedom. Authentic recognition 
from both parties involved can lead to positive social interactions.  
 
Recognition qua Leaping-in 
The other fundamental example of solicitude that Heidegger describes in S. 26 is 
leaping-in. In this mode Dasein is fundamentally failing to understand; to recognise the 
other as a Dasein. The Dasein that leaps in for the other “fails to recognise: that the other 
Dasein is fellow human being; that she has projects (and selfhood) of her own; and that she 
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is capable of carrying out her projects and of becoming a self.”171 All of which is an act of 
reifying the other. In fact, Freeman coins this mode of solicitude “ontological reification”.172 
In leaping-in the other’s care is taken away from it. Perhaps rather than taking it literally 
that the other’s care is taken away completely, we should actually be viewing it in terms of 
recognition: Dasein has failed to recognise the Other’s Being aptly, so in that sense correct 
recognition of the other’s care is lacking, rather than their fundamental ontological 
structure of care.  
Towards the end of Section 26 Heidegger suggests ‘The Being-with-one-another of 
those who are hired for the same affair often thrives only on mistrust.’173 Now this is 
something that isn’t elaborated on much. However, we can see the direct parallel here 
between what Heidegger is suggesting and the issues that are occurring between politicians. 
We have already discussed mistrust between the public and politicians but perhaps mistrust 
can also occur between politicians. Many politicians who are supposedly working towards 
the same goal; fixing the same issue in society, don’t seem to trust one another. Now that 
there is growing pressure on parliament to work together to fix the issue of the departure 
from the EU, issues surrounding mistrust are emerging. The vote of confidence against 
Theresa May helps justify the claim that there is just as much mistrust between politicians 
as there is between the public and politicians.  
This mistrust could be framed in terms of recognition. Both sides are wishing to be 
deemed the people who can ‘solve’ the Brexit dilemma. Thus they wish to frame the other 
as being inept, which is actually not that difficult to pull off given the way Brexit is going. If 
both sides are framing the other as unsuccessful in some way with regards to Brexit, then 
naturally both sides will begin to distrust one another. This inauthentic recognition is in fact 
a failure to recognise the other as Dasein. By framing the other politician in thing-like terms, 
as a kind of Kantian means-to-an-end, each person is reifying the other. The inability to aptly 
recognise the other doesn’t just limit the other’s Being, it also limits the one who is acting 
inauthentically as by failing to correctly recognise the other as Dasein, they are failing to 
recognise a fundamental part of their own Being - Being-with.  
 
171 Lauren Freeman, “Love is Not Blind: In/visibility and Recognition in M. Heidegger’s Thinking” in In/visibility: 
Perspectives on Inclusion and Exclusion, ed. L. Freeman, Vienna: IWM Junior Visiting Fellows’ Conferences, 26 
(2009). 
172 L. Freeman, “Love is Not Blind”.  
173 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.159 sz.122. 
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Recognition qua Indifference 
Perhaps the most destructive form of recognition that can be drawn from S. 26 is the 
kind involved in ‘indifference’. Indifference could be described as the deficient mode of 
solicitude: “being-for, -against, or -without one another; passing the other by; not 
“mattering” to one another.”174 When people seem indifferent to others, it is indicative of a 
refusal to acknowledge and recognise the other, an ignoring of the other.175 Indifference 
towards others tends to involve a passiveness for the other person; a sense of not caring for 
the other. In fact it is difficult to distinguish whether indifference refers to a refusal to 
recognise the other, or a misrecognition of not seeing the other as a fellow Dasein, and in 
turn not recognising our own Being. Whichever way it is viewed, this attitude is destructive. 
An example of indifference could be when a politician doesn’t recognise his or her 
constituents as having their Being-to-be, as having needs and requirements that they can 
help with from their position of power. 
 
Where do we stand now? 
Not only does this supressed account of recognition give us a further ethical 
dimension to Heidegger’s BT, but it can be utilised when discussing how to engage 
authentically with politics. Specifically, the supressed account of recognition could be useful 
when deliberating over those who are acting positively within politics and those that are 
not. In this way it can be used as a diagnostic, and a critical, tool. We can read about 
politicians in the press, read about their encounters with others, and then using the 
supressed account we can identify which type of recognition she or he generally adheres to, 
and then go on to decide whether or not they are acting in good faith, or not. This account 
of recognition equips us with a way of evaluating our interactions with others. For example, 
if Emma has a discussion with someone about politics and they seem to be making claims 
that they don’t have much evidence for, yet they are pushing the ideas on Emma, in a sense 
they seem to be leaping-in for Emma; the person isn’t letting her think for herself; they are 
not recognising her being-to-be. The recognition involved is thus inauthentic. Emma can 
 
174 L. Freeman, “Recognition Reconsidered: A re-reading of Heidegger’s Being and Time S.26” p.91. 
175 L. Freeman, “Recognition Reconsidered: A re-reading of Heidegger’s Being and Time S.26” p.89.  
 70 
later think on this interaction and decide whether she wants to enter into this kind of 
encounter again, or how she could act differently in order to combat the inauthentic actions 
of the other person involved in the discussion. It is in this way that the suppressed account 
of recognition can give us a way of evaluating interactions, and thus can help us in these 
interactions, in the sphere of politics and out of it.  
Conclusion 
 
For many, politics has become this ineffable entity; something that one occasionally 
dips into when necessary, but not something to be understood in its entirety. However, 
once we reduce politics to what it truly is about: people; then it has the chance of becoming 
something many of us might feel we can engage with. In order to understand people; 
namely the interactions between them, we had to first delve into our own Being. 
Heidegger’s BT aided us here. By getting to grips with Dasein, it’s authentic and inauthentic 
modes, we were able to lay the groundwork for an approach to politics. With the help of 
Marx and Vogel a form of authentic Mitsein was reconstructed from Heidegger’s BT.  An 
examination of Lauren Freeman’s paper provided us with an accessible Heideggerian 
account of recognition. All of which enabled us to construct a kind of Heideggerian ethics 
that had authentic Mitsein at its heart. With that we were able to demonstrate that BT does 
have the framework to support positive interactions with other people, and therefore can 
provide the foundations for the way we view people, and also the way we ought to be 
viewing them. I believe that we have gained a useful, and interesting perspective due to our 
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